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INTRODUCTION

The failures of the existing prison system' have sparked a
widespread movement toward community-based alternatives
for the rehabilitation of offenders. 2 Increasing numbers of half1.

See, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 5-6 (1974); W.

NAGEL, THE NEW RED BARN:

A

CRrriCAL LOOK AT AMERICAN PRISONS

138-39

(1973); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 397 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as CHALLENGE OF CRIME]; STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 23 (American Friends Service
Committee 1971). See also L. CARNEY, PROBATION AND PAROLE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 208 (1977); The Role of Prisonsin Society: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Penitentiariesand Correctionsof the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1977) (statement of Dr. Robert B. Coates); Therapeutic Community Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3227 Before the Subcomm. on
Penitentiariesand Correctionsof the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1978) (statement of Senator Dennis DeConcini) [hereinafter cited
as Hearingson S. 3227]. Indeed, it has been suggested that the modern prison,
throughout its 150-year history, has been and inevitably must be a failure. See
M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIrTH OF THE PRISON 271-72, 276-78
(A. Sheridan trans. 1977). These criticisms of the prison are remarkably durable, and are not limited to an American version. See id. at 264-68.
2. See generally ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON (G. Perlstein & T. Phelps eds.
1975); P. HAHN, COMMUNrrY BASED CORRECTIONS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1975). These extra-institutional rehabilitation approaches have developed in response to concern that rehabilitative efforts that have been tried
within prisons have not worked. See CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 412.
See generally D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975); Martinson, What Works--Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); SUBCOMM. ON
PENITENTIARIES AND CORRECTIONS OF THE SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

AN-

NUAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 95-909, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1978). But see T.
PALMER, CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTION AND RESEARCH 15-36 passim (1978). Although noting that more recent programs may show more promise, a recent
study of offender rehabilitation performed under the auspices of the National
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way houses, residential treatment centers, short-term custodial
facilities, and other community-based placements 3 are evidence
of the correctional community's strong desire to avoid the isolation, institutional culture, and severing of family and other noncriminal ties that mark prison life. 4 This trend includes the
diversion of defendants from the criminal justice system at the
entry point, by redirecting them to a variety of community
treatment settings such as drug rehabilitation programs, community mental health clinics, state mental hospitals, sex offender programs, alcohol treatment programs, and day
treatment centers. 5 Judges are even permitted, under statutes
such as the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, to sentence convicted defendants "to the custody of the Attorney
General for treatment and supervision." 6 Part of this development includes more extensive use of probation7 and early or
Academy of Sciences found Lipton, Martinson, and Wflks' conclusions "reasonably accurate and fair." See PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABIIrTATIVE TECHNIQUES OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNcIL, THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL
OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 5 (L. Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds.
1979) [hereinafter cited as REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES]. However, Palmer's
"optimistic view cannot be supported ....
" Id. at 31. The Panel study concluded that:
The entire body of research appears to justify only the conclusion that
we do not now know of any program or method of rehabilitation that
could be guaranteed to reduce the criminal activity of released offenders. Although a generous reviewer of the literature might discern some
glimmers of hope, those glimmers are so few, so scattered, and so inconsistent that they do not serve as a basis for any recommendation
other than continued research.
Id. at 3. A recent critical analysis of the evaluation literature found most studies inadequate for failure to measure the "strength" or intensity of the treatment, or its "integrity" or consistency in administration. See Sechrest &
Redner, Strength and Integrity in Evaluation Studies, in How WELL DOES IT
WoRx: A REVIEw OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION 1978 19 (1978).
3. For a comprehensive bibliography concerning alternatives to institutionalization, see J. BRANTLEY, ALTERNATIVES TO INsTrrUIONALIZATION: A DEFINITIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY (1979).
4. See generally N. MORRmS, supra note 1, at 5-9; CHALLENGE OF CRIME,
supra note 1, at 384-98.
5. See generally NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER OF
THE ABA COMMn'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTION TECHNIQUES AND ACTION PROGRAMS (2d ed. 1975); R.
NIMMER, DIVERSION:

THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUTION

(1974); Carter, The Diversionof Offenders, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1972, at 31; Vorenberg & Vorenberg, Early Diversionfrom the CriminalJustice System, in PRisONERS IN AMERICA 151 (L Ohlin ed. 1973); Note, Pretrial Diversion from the
Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827 (1974). The Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration has aided the movement toward early diversion by providing
federal funding for the development of community corrections programs. Vorenberg & Vorenberg, supra, at 163.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976).
7. See United States v. Mercado, 469 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1972)
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partial release programs, including work release, educational
release, furloughs, and contract parole, all of which frequently
are tied to some form of community-based treatment.8
Indeed, major portions of the criminal justice system have
undergone a "process of divestment" and whole classes of social deviants find themselves under the control of a new "therapeutic state."9 As a result, an enormous potential for abuse has
emerged as relatively innocuous counseling programs have
been replaced, both in the prison and in the community, with
increasingly more sophisticated rehabilitative programs that
utilize neurological technologies, behavior modification, and
other controversial therapies.O Whether these alternative therapies are more effective than traditional incarceration is an empirical question that has received increasing attention by social
scientists, but remains unresolved."
Nevertheless, the demand for alternative programs continues to grow. A recent survey12 revealed that 71% of the public
favors research to develop tests that predict violent behavior
and 64% would favor the coercive administration to violent of(court may condition probation on offender's application for treatment); Moore
v. United States, 387 A.2d 714, 716 (D.C. 1978) (probation conditioned on mental
examination).
8.

See ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RE-

LATING TO PROBATION § 3.2(c) (v) (tentative draft 1970); A. ScUL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW 45-49 (1977);
See generally L. CARNEY, supra note 2.
9.

N. KrITRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THE-

ORY 4-8, 39-44 (1971). For critical perspectives on the diversion and deinstitutionalization process, see generally A. ScULL, supra note 8; Szasz, Psychiatric
Diversion in the CriminalJustice System, in MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 54 (N. Beran & B. Toomey eds. 1979).
10. See generally J. MrrFoRD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973); Halleck,
Psychiatry and Social Control: Two ContradictoryScenarios, in MENTALLY ILL
OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 24 (N. Beran & B. Toomey eds.
1979); Delgado, OrganicallyInduced Behavioral Change in CorrectionalInstitutions: Release Decisions and "New Man" Phenomenon, 50 S. CAL.L. REV. 215,
217-18, 223-38 (1977); Opton, PsychiatricViolence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 MISS. L.J. 605 (1974); Rothman, Behavior Modification in
Total Institutions, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (Feb. 1975); Note, Conditioning
and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?""Demolish?"Prisoners
and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972).
11. See generally P. LERMAN, CoMMUNrrY TREATMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL
(1975); J. McCord, Consideration of Some Effects of a Counseling Program
(June 11-13, 1979) (unpublished paper presented at Conference of the Panel on
Research on Rehabilitative Techniques of the Comm. on Research on Law Enforcement & Criminal Justice, Nat'l Research Council).
12. The survey was conducted through the NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPECIAL STUDY: IMPUCATIONS OF ADVANCES IN BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL

RESEARCH (1978) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
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fenders of a drug purported to prevent violence. 13 An additional 10% of the public, while against forced medication, favors
the availability of such a drug as an alternative to prison.14
Several important issues are raised by such alternative
treatments, as well as by the research that inevitably precedes,
accompanies, and evaluates them. The most fundamental issue
is whether offenders have a right to refuse any of the treatment
techniques, and if so, which ones. Resolution of this issue will
determine whether judges can sentence offenders to treatment
in lieu of prison or as a condition of probation, whether parole
boards can condition parole on participation in these therapy
programs, and whether corrections authorities can require prisoners to participate simply as part of their confinement. An important related issue is whether offenders have the capacity to
give informed consent to treatments they may have a right to
refuse, and if so, what procedures are necessary to ensure that
consent is properly obtained. Similarly, procedural due process
guarantees must be examined against the whole range of treatment stages: when, if at all, are notice and a hearing required
and what should be the scope and structure of the hearing?
The legal limitations on correctional research that tests the efficacy of these alternative dispositions and new experimental approaches, or the validity of new hypotheses concerning the
causes and correlates of criminality, must also be explored.
The law is just beginning to deal with these difficult issues.
In 1974, Congress created the National Commission for the Protection of Research Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National Commission),15 and directed it to conduct a
special study of the ethical, social, and legal implications of advances in biomedical and behavioral research and technology.
Although this special study has now been issued,16 it hardly begins to deal with the legal implications of the new technologies.
A successor commission-the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, established in 19781 7-is charged with study13. Policy Research Inc. & Center for Technology Assessment, A Comprehensive Study of the Ethica4 Lega4 and Social Implications of Advances in Biomedical and Behavioral Research and Technology, in SPECIAL STUDY, supra
note 12, at 174.
14. Id.
15. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L No. 93-348, § 201,
88 Stat. 342.
16. SPECIAL STUDy, supra note 12.
17. Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L No. 95-622, § 301, 92 Stat. 3437 (codified in 42

U.S.C. § 300v (Supp. II 1978)).
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ing these same issues and making recommendations for
legislative and administrative action.
This Article first reviews the existing framework of legal restrictions on correctional treatment and research. It then proposes a continuum of intrusiveness along which the various
treatment techniques could be arrayed and analyzes the legal
implications at several junctures on the continuum. The suggested framework avoids singular, all-encompassing answers,
demonstrating instead that the balance between governmental
interests and individual rights of offenders may be struck differently for particular treatment approaches. After analyzing
the offender's right to refuse treatment along the continuum of
intrusiveness, the issues related to informed consent, procedural due process, and limits on correctional research are also examined in light of the continuum framework. As with the right
to refuse treatment, these legal issues are resolved differently
at various points along the continuum. Although others may
define points along the continuum differently than they are defined here, it is hoped that the framework presented will direct
the inquiry away from the current static, conclusory analysis
and instead encourage examination of the degree of intrusiveness of individual treatments.
II.

SOURCES OF LEGAL LIMITATION

Legal limitations on treatment, rehabilitation, and the design or implementation of research on offenders, both within
and outside the prison, derive from a number of sources.
A.

STATUTORY LIMITS

Both state and federal statutes pose some limitations on
treatment or research dealing with offenders. A survey conducted by the staff of the National Commission's reveals that at
least nine states have legislation on biomedical research with
prisoners, and ten have legislation concerning behavioral research.19 Of these states, only Oregon has imposed a flat statutory ban on both types of research with prisoners.20 Several
states place statutory limits on coercive treatment of mental
18. NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HmIAN SUBJECTS or BiOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS (1976)
[hereinafter cited as PRISONER RESEARCH].
19. See Survey of Present Status of PrisonInmate Involvement in Biomedical and Behavioral Research in State CorrectionalFacilities,in PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 17-5 to 17-6 app. [hereinafter cited as Present Status].
20. See OR. REV. STAT. § 421.085 (1973).
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patients, but only a few of these statutes apply to prisoners. 21
The federal Privacy Act22 and similar state statutes 23 may limit
agency disclosure of records compiled in correctional research
and guarantee subjects access to such data.
California has been the forerunner in adopting limits on
therapy and experimentation and currently has the most extensive statutory approach to these problems. A pioneering statute limits the use of "organic therapies" on prisoners and
mental patients by declaring that all persons "have a fundamental right against enforced interference with their thought
processes, states of mind, and patterns of mentation." 24 The
statute guarantees that, with certain exceptions, competent
persons may refuse "organic therapies," including "the use of
any drugs, electric shocks, electronic stimulation of the brain,
or infliction of physical pain when used as an aversive or reinforcing stimulus in a program of aversive, classical, or operant
conditioning."25 To administer any organic therapy to a person
not capable of consenting,2 6 the state must first obtain a court
order 27 based upon a showing that the proposed therapy will be
beneficial, that its administration is supported by a compelling
state interest, that there are no less onerous alternative therapies available, and that the therapy is in accordance with medi28
cal-psychiatric practice.
In 1977, the California statute was amended to include a
provision dealing with biomedical and behavioral research on
21. See Plotldn, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients'Right to
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 504-25 (1977) (statutory compilation).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976). Other federal laws protecting the privacy of patients or research subjects include the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91616, § 333, 84 Stat. 1848 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4582 (1976)), and the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in
scattered sections of 5, 18 U.S.C.). See Madden & Lessin, Privacy and Confidentiality of Social Science Research Information, in PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN APPLIED
SOCIAL RESEARCH 3-1 (R. Boruch, J. Ross & J. Cecil eds. 1979).
23. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15:574.12(D) (3) (West Supp. 1980); VA.
CODE § 19.2-389 (Supp. 1980). For a compilation of state statutes, see Madden &
Lesin, supra note 22, at 3-13.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West Supp. 1970). See generally Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive
Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAi. L. REV. 237 (1974).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670.5(c) (3) (West Supp. 1970-1979).
26. Id. at § 2670.5(b). Psychosurgery is prohibited altogether for persons
lacking the capacity for informed consent Id. at § 3507.
27. Id. at § 2675(a).
28. Id. at § 2679(b).
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prisoners. 29 This new provision affirms the fundamental right
of competent adults to decide whether to participate in such research 3O and restricts the type of behavioral research 3' allowed
to "studies of the possible causes, effects and processes of incarceration and studies of prisons as institutional structures
: . . which present minimal or no risk and no more than mere
inconvenience to the subjects of the research." 32 Behavioral research within the coverage of the statute may not be conducted
without the informed consent of the subjects unless an institutional review board concludes that consent would be unnecessary or would significantly inhibit the research. 33 To authorize
research generally, the review board must determine that the
risks to participating prisoners are outweighed by the benefits
to the prisoner and the importance of the knowledge to be
34
gained.
Other provisions of the California statute limit the use of
psychotropic medication and behavioral techniques on prisoners. 35 Psychotropic drugs may be used only when they are a
part of the prisoners' conventional medical treatment and are
carefully monitored and evaluated, or when they are needed for
research designed to test the pharmacological or chemical
properties of the drugs but then only if there is no serious risk
to the prisoners' mental or physical well-being.3 6 Behavioral
techniques may be used only if they are "medically and socially acceptable" and do not inflict permanent physical or psy37
chological injury.
Biomedical research, defined broadly to include any re29. Act of Oct. 1, 1977, ch. 1250, § 3, 1977 Cal. Stats. 4276-81 (codified in CAL.
PENA . CODE §§ 3500-3524 (West Supp. 1970-1979)).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3501 (West Supp. 1970-1979).
31. Behavioral research is defined to include studies involving "the investigation of human behavior, emotions, adaption, conditioning, and response in a
program designed to test certain hypotheses through the collection of objective
data." Id. at § 3500(a).
32. Id. at § 3505. Excluded from this restriction is the use of statistical data
to evaluate "programs to which inmates are routinely assigned, such as,. . . education, vocational training, productive work, counseling, recognized therapies,
and programs which are not experimental in nature." Id. at § 3500.
33. See id. at § 3505.
34. Id. at § 3515(a). Equitable procedures must be followed in the selection of prisoner research subjects and legally effective informed consent must
be obtained. Id. at § 3515. Such consent is valid only after the subject has had
both an oral and written explanation of all procedures and risks involved. Id.
at § 3521.
35. Id. at § 3507.
36. Id.
37. Id. at § 3508.
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search relating to or involving biological, medical, or physical
39
science,3 8 is prohibited altogether without informed consent.
The statute's focus on the type of research rather than on its
effects on subjects, however, may result in too sweeping a prohibition on biomedical research. For example, research on genetic influences on criminality that compares criminality
among twins or among adoptees and their adoptive and biological parents 4 would appear to be prohibited without informed
consent. Yet such studies invade only informational privacy
and do not violate the physical or even mental integrity of the
research subject. Moreover, limiting participation to those who
consent may well have the effect of contaminating the sample
studied, with the result that it may be impossible to meet ac41
cepted standards of research methodology.
Although this difficulty exemplifies the problems that can
attend quick statutory solutions, on the whole this kind of legislative experimentation with solutions is commendable. Statutory solutions also have the advantage of being amenable to
revision based upon the enlightenment that occasionally comes
with the passage of time. By contrast, judicial solutions provided by the Supreme Court through the expansion of constitutional doctrine are more rigid, subject to change only if the
Court overrules its own precedent or through the rarely invoked constitutional amendment process.
In addition to California, a few other states have attempted
statutory approaches to the problems of therapeutic intervention or experimentation with offenders; 42 but generally, few
statutory controls exist. Despite legislative reports, 43 hearings,4 4 and proposals, 45 no federal statutes presently govern
38. Id. at § 3500(b).
39. Id. at § 3502. Indeed, willful failure to obtain a subject's informed consent, in any experiment that involves a risk or physical or psychological harm,
is a misdemeanor. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24176(c) (West Supp. 19701979).
40. See generally BIosocmAL BASES OF CRnmAL BEHAVIOR (S. Mednick &
K. Christiansen eds. 1977); Farrington, Longitudinal Research on Crime and Delinquency, in 1 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 289, 31417 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1979).
41. See Riecken, Overview of Solutions to Ethical and Legal Dilemmas of
Social Research, in PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON
ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH 2-7 (R. Boruch, J.

Ross & J. Cecil eds. 1979).
42. See Present Status, supra note 19, at 17-5 to 17-6 app.
43. E.g., STAFF OF SuBcoMrM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SEN.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1974).

44. E.g., Hearings on S. 3227, supra note 1.
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these matters. The newly formed President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and

Behavioral Research, however, is charged with making recommendations for legislative action. 4 6 As the trend toward thera-

peutic intervention and correctional research grows, there will
undoubtedly be more state and federal legislative approaches
to these issues.
B.

REGULATORY LIMITS

Another source of legal control of the treatment of and research on offenders is regulatory law-rules adopted by federal,
state, or local corrections agencies, or other administrative
units, to regulate treatment or research efforts that involve
prisoners or offenders in community programs. Certain regulations of the United States Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW), for example, mandate institutional review
boards and other procedures designed to ensure that informed
consent of research subjects is obtained. 47 Under these regulations, HEW support of biomedical and behavioral research on
prisoners is permitted only if the research is approved by an institutional review board on which prisoners or their representatives must serve. 48
HEW regulations also restrict the purposes of such research to (a) study of the causes, effects, and processes of incarceration and criminal behavior, (b) study of prisons as
institutional structures or prisoners as incarcerated persons,
(c) research on conditions particularly affecting prisoners as a
class or on social and psychological problems affecting prisoners, and (d) research on practices intended to improve the
health or well-being of the prisoner-subject. 49 The first two ar-

eas may be investigated only if the proposed study presents no
more than minimal risk and inconvenience to the subject;5 0 the
latter two are permitted only after HEW consults with appropriate experts and gives advance notice in the Federal Register
of its intent to approve such research.5 1 Except for research in
45. E.g., S. 3227, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in Hearings on S.
3227, supra note 1, at 125-32.
46. The Commission was established by the Community Mental Health
Extension Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-622, § 301, 92 Stat. 3437 (to be codified in 42

U.S.C. § 30Ov).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1979).
Id. at §§ 46.301-306.
Id. at § 46.306(a) (2) (A)-(D).
Id. at § 46.306(a) (2) (A)-(B).
Id. at § 46.306(a) (2) (C)-(D).
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these areas and under these procedures, "biomedical or behavioral research conducted or supported by DHEW shall not in52
volve prisoners as subjects."
The National Commission's Study on Research Involving
Prisoners cites several states in which experimentation on prisoners has been barred or limited by agency regulation.53 After
the National Commission began holding hearings in connection
with its prison study, the Federal Bureau of Prisons announced
an indefinite moratorium on nontherapeutic biomedical experimentation in federal prisons. 54 Although regulatory limits on
biomedical and behavioral experimentation or on correctional
therapy are still the exception, increased regulation at both federal and state levels can be anticipated. Indeed, the flexibility
and specialized expertise of agencies in general may make
them the most appropriate forum for innovation.
C.

INTERNATIONAL LAW LIMITS

International customary or common law and treaties to
which the United States is a party are also possible sources of
restrictions on correctional treatment and research. The Nuremberg Code,55 for example, provides a comprehensive statement of the requirements of informed consent to human
experimentation, and broadly asserts that the consent of the
subject is "absolutely essential." The Code specifies that such
consent must be competent, voluntary, informed, and understanding.56 It is unclear whether the Code, which is assertedly
based on "the principles of the law of nations," 57 has the force
of international law.58 Some commentators argue that the
52.
53.
54.

Id. at § 46.306(b).
See Present Status, supra note 19, at 17-5 to 17-6 app.
Branson, Prison Research: National Commission Says "No, Unless

",1. 7 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 15, 16 (Feb. 1977).

55. The "Code" is actually the ten principles on human experimentation
set forth in the judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in the case of
United States v. Karl Brandt. See The Medical Case, in I & II TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALs BEFORE THE NUERNBERG M=rrARy TRrBuNALS (1949) [hereinafter
cited as NUERNBERG TRIALS], reprinted in J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH
HUMAN BEINGs 292 (1972). The principles set forth in the Brandt case-the trial
of 23 German physicians for war crimes involving experiments with prisoners
of war and civilians-have come to be known as the "Nuremberg Code." See II
NUERNBERG TRIALS, supra, at 181-82, J. KATZ, supra, at 305-06.
56. See II NUERNBERG TRiALS, supra note 55, at 181-82, J. KATZ, supra note
55, at 305-06.
57. See id. at 183, J. KATZ at 306.
58. See Jonnes, The Nuremberg Lawyers, Nat'l UJ., Jan. 7, 1980, at 1 (disagreement among former Nuremberg prosecutors as to the status of the Nuremberg principles in international law).
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Code and its progeny, the Declaration of Helsinki,59 have been
incorporated into international customary or common law, 60
but this conclusion is not yet widely accepted. Moreover, the
Nuremberg Code may not be independently binding; historic
precedent suggests that American courts may not apply international customary law even if domestic practices are found to

violate

it.61

Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of
Helsinki have been and will continue to be influential in the
formulation of policy and law in this area. Many HEW regulations on the protection of human subjects, for example, are derived from the Code, as are the Food and Drug Administration
regulations restricting the investigational use of new drugs and
the Army Department regulations on the use of volunteers as
subjects of research. 62 A Michigan trial court adopted the
Code's requirements for informed consent in Kaimowitz v.
Michigan Department of Mental Health,63 an influential opinion
on the use of psychosurgery. Furthermore, because the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki may be regarded
as formal expressions of agreed-upon medical ethics in the conduct of experimentation, their principles may be absorbed into
tort law standards governing medical malpractice. It is questionable, however, whether the Code will be held to be an independently binding source of law limiting correctional practices.
Moreover, although the Code speaks broadly of all human experimentation, it was adopted in the context of nontherapeutic
medical experimentation and its application outside of this
area-to therapeutic medical research, behavioral research, or
survey research, for example-seems doubtful.
59. Reprinted in PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 21-1 to 21-6 app.
The Declaration was adopted by the Eighteenth World Medical Assembly in
Helsinki, Finland, in 1964, and was revised by the Twenty-ninth World Medical
Assembly in Tokyo, Japan, in-1975. See CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHIcs 4-5
(T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978).
60. See G. ANNAS, L. GLANTz & B. KATz, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN ExPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 8 (1977); R. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 239 (1962).

61. See generally Lillich, The ProperRole of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970). But see The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700; Fillatiga v. Pifla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. See Veatch, EthicalPrinciplesin MedicalExperimentation, in ETHICAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 32-33 (A. Rivlin & P. Timpane
eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES].
63. No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 23-25 (Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July
10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH

SYSTEM 902, 913-14 (1974).
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D. JuDicL LIMrTs
1.

Tort Law

Tort law may also provide a source of legal limitation on
unwanted therapy or participation in research. The law of battery, for example, recognizes a remedy in damages for deliberate touchings or other invasions of bodily integrity that are not
64
legally privileged or to which the victim has not consented.
Thus, any medical procedure performed without first obtaining
the informed consent of the patient is, with few exceptions, an
actionable tort.65 As Justice Cardozo stated in his classic formulation of the principle: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he
is liable in damages." 66 This tort principle was applied in the
prison context in Irwin v. Arrendale,67 when a prisoner sustained injuries incident to an x-ray performed without his consent. Stressing the consensual nature of the physician-patient
relationship even within prison, the Georgia court held that the
x-ray procedure constituted a battery, but noted that compulsory medical examination to protect the health of other in68
mates or of the public would be permitted.
Several other tort theories may apply to correctional treatment or research. Any treatment performed in a negligent
fashion and causing injury, for example, would be actionable
malpractice, even if consent had been obtained.69 The law of
negligence may also hold researchers liable for injuries inflicted by procedures that deviate from standard and accepted
research practice.7 0 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that strict liability should apply when any harm results
64. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 165 (4th ed.
1971).
65. Id. at 165-66. If consent was not obtained, the patient may recover
damages even if the procedure did not result in harm. Id. See Goldstein, For
Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapmen4 Informed
Consen4 and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975).
66. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-130, 105 N.E. 92,
93, 133 N.Y.S. 1143 (1914).
67. 117 Ga. App. 1, 159 S.E.2d 719 (1967).
68. Id. at 8, 159 S.E.2d at 725.
69. W. PROSSER, supra note 64, at 162-63. See generally J. KING, THE LAw
OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL 36-80 (1977); D. LOUISELL & H. WiLLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
3.01-3.22 (1977).
70. See Jaffe, Law as a System of Control, in EXPERIMENTATION wrrT
HuMAN SUBJECTS 203-04 (P. Freund ed. 1969).
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from nontherapeutic experimentation. 7 ' Other traditional torts,
such as invasion of privacy and intentional or negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, might also provide grounds
72
for a claim.
The question remains whether policies favoring rehabilitation or the expansion of knowledge with respect to the causes
and treatment of criminality render treatment or research privileged that would otherwise be tortious. These issues have
been rarely litigated in the prison context and even less so in
noninstitutional settings. Because participating prisoners usually "volunteer" to avoid more restrictive conditions and generally lack the resources to press damage actions against their
keepers, challenges to correctional rehabilitation or research
may be rare. Moreover, correctional officials are clothed with
immunity from liability for tortious conduct occurring in good
faith. 73 For these and other institutional reasons, slowly developing tort law is not likely to prove an adequate source of limitation on correctional research and therapy.
2.

ConstitutionalLaw

By far the most important source of legal restriction on correctional therapy and experimentation is the United States
Constitution and, to varying degrees, state constitutions. As recently as the mid-1960s most courts applied a "hands off" policy
with 'respect to prisoners seeking judicial remedies against
prison authorities,7 4 but there has been a near revolution in the
area of prisoners' rights since that time. Courts have increasingly extended constitutional protections to state and federal
prisoners and have fashioned judicial remedies for the violation
of constitutional rights,75 exhibiting a degree of activism recently approved by the Supreme Court: "The deplorable conditions and draconian restrictions of some of our nation's prisons
are too well known to require recounting here, and the federal
71. See C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND
SOCIAL POLICY 27-28 (1974). See also Calabresi, Reflections on Medical Experimentation with Humans, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 178-96 (P.
Freund ed. 1970).
72. See Friedman, Legal Regulation of Applied Behavior Analysis in
Mental Institutionsand Prisons, 17 ARIz. I REV. 39, 55 (1975). See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 64, § 12 (intentional infliction of emotional distress), § 54
(negligent infliction of emotional distress), § 117 (invasion of privacy).
73. See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1978).
74. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of JudicialRefusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE LJ. 506 (1963).
75. See generally Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging JudicialRole
in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971).
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courts rightly have condemned these sordid aspects of our
76
prison systems."
It is now generally recognized that prisoners "retain all of
their constitutional rights except for those which must be impinged upon for security or rehabilitative purposes." 77 The
Supreme Court has held that due process protections apply to
prisoners subjected to additional deprivations of liberty or
property, 78 that prisoners generally enjoy freedom of speech
and religion under the first amendment, 79 and that they are
protected against both invidious racial discrimination under
the equal protection clause8 O and cruel and unusual punish8
ment under the eighth amendment. 1
Although there are few cases applying these rights in the
context of correctional therapy or research, a growing body of
recent case law82 and commentary 83 suggests that involuntarily
committed mental patients have a constitutional right to refuse
certain types of mental health treatment. The essential notion
involved in these cases is that people retain a core residuum of
personal liberty-of privacy, bodily integrity, and unimpaired
mental processes-that the Constitution protects from governmental invasion. Protection of this personal liberty may derive
76. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979).
77. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 98 (N.D. Ohio 1971), enforced, 330
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom.Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court recently reiterated that "convicted prisoners do
not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979). The Court, in
holding the protections of due process applicable to prisoners subjected to additional deprivations of liberty and property, had previously affirmed that
"there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of
this country." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1976).
78. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91 (1980) (due process hearing
required for prison-hospital transfers); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 817-18
(1977) (due process right of access to the courts); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 555-56 (1974) (minimal due process proceedings required for certain prison
disciplinary proceedings).
79. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (speech); Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (religion).
80. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968).
81. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102-05 (1976). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979)
(punishment of pretrial detainees would violate substantive due process).
82. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 945-46 (3d Cir. 1976) (drug treatment); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (aversive conditioning); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW, slip
op. at 22-40 (Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A.
BROOKS, supra note 63, at 912-21 (psychosurgery).
83. See generally Friedman, upra note 72; Plotkin, supra note 21; Shapiro,
supra note 24 Wexler, Token and Taboo: BehaviorModification, Token Economies, and the Law, 61 CAimF. L. REv. 81 (1973); Note, supra note 10.
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from a variety of constitutional sources, but central to the concept are the right of privacy and the first amendment right to
freedom from interference with one's mental processes.
84
In Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health,
a defendant charged with murder and rape was held in a state
mental hospital under the Michigan sexual psychopath law.
The defendant was transferred to a clinic for experimental psychosurgery aimed at the treatment of uncontrollable aggression.8 5 The proposed experiment, funded by the Michigan
Legislature, sought to compare the aggression-reducing effects
of surgery on a portion of the brain with the similar effects of a
drug which affected male hormone flow. Although the defendant/patient signed an "informed consent" form to become an
experimental subject, and although the procedure was approved by both a scientific review committee and a human
rights committee, the court ruled that performing the surgery
on an involuntarily detained patient would violate both the first
amendment and the constitutional right to privacy. 86 The court
reasoned that "[t]o the extent the First Amendment protects
the dissemination of ideas and the expression of thoughts, it
87
equally must protect the individual's right to generate ideas."
Concluding that the psychosurgery would violate the constitutional right of privacy, the court noted that "no privacy [is]
more deserving of constitutional protection than that of one's
mind," and that "[i]f one is not protected in his thoughts, behavior, personality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes meaningless." 88
84. No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 63.
85. Id., slip op. at 2-3, A. BROOKS at 902-03.
86. Id. at 32-40, A. BROOKS, at 916-21.
87. Id. at 35, A. BROOKS at 918. The court's holding finds support in language contained in Supreme Court opinions that, although in contexts unrelated to imposed therapy, suggest the existence of first amendment protection
for an individual's thoughts and mental processes. In Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), for example, the Court, holding that the Constitution places
limits on the power of the states to make criminal the private possession of obscene materials in an individual's home, stated that:
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.... Whatever the power
of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to that
public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on the
desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.
Id. at 565-66.
88. No. 73-19434-AW, slip op. at 38, reprintedin A. BROOKS, supra note 63, at
920.
Early Supreme Court cases referred to "the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person." Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
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More recently, courts have employed the first amendment
and the constitutional right to privacy to protect the right of patients to refuse other types of interventions. Several lower federal courts have found a first amendment limitation on
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to state
mental hospital patients. 9 In Runnels v. Rosendale,90 the right
to privacy was applied in the prison context to permit a damage
action under the Civil Rights Act for a state prisoner subjected
to hemorrhoid surgery without his consent and over his expressed objections. In Runnels, the Ninth Circuit court found a
"constitutionally protected right to be secure in the privacy of
one's own body against invasions by the state except where
necessary to support a compelling state interest."9 ' Other
cases have invoked constitutional privacy to protect the right of
mental patients to refuse electroconvulsive therapy and
psychotropic medication. 92
Thus, there clearly is a core of personal liberties that prisoners retain under the Constitution and that courts will intervene to protect. Whether any particular treatment or research
project can be conducted over the objection of its patient-subjects, however, is a more complex question.
Before analyzing this issue, two additional but more lim250, 251 (1891). Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a celebrated dissenting opinion, spoke
of the "right to be let alone" as applying "to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations." Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). More recent cases
have explicitly recognized a constitutional right of personal privacy, employing
it to protect from government interference a woman's decision whether to have
an abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 147-64 (1973), and a patient's decision to
decline life-sustaining treatment. Superintendent of Belchertown School v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-42, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-27 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 40-41, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert.denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Eichner, 73
A.D.2d 431, -, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 537-40 (1980). See generally L TmBE, Am.mCAn
CONsTrrU oNAL LAw 886-990 (1978).
89. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Rogers v. Okin, 478
F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979).
90. 489 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
91. Id. at 735.
92. For a constitutional right to refuse electroconvulsive therapy, see Bell
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Price v.
Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 257, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (1976). For a constitutional
right to refuse drugs, see Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Davis
v. Hubbard, No. C73-205 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980), summarized at 49 U.S.L.W.
2215 (1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1367 (D. Mass. 1979), affd in part,
28 CRiM. L. Rprm 2397 (1st Cir. 1980); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143-44
(D.N.J. 1978) (preliminary injunction), 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1307 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed, Nos. 79-2576, 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1980); Souder v. McGuire,
423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F.
Supp. 1085, 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1974); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1980).
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ited sources of constitutional protection should be noted. The
first is the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment which has been held to "draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."93 Mr. Justice Brennan defined the core prohibition of the eighth amendment as "the infliction of uncivilized
and inhuman punishments. The State, even as it punishes,
must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as
human beings. A punishment is 'cruel and unusual,' therefore,
if it does not comport with human dignity."94
The chief difficulty with applying the eighth amendment is
distinguishing "punishment" from "therapy." A fairly clear
case was presented in Knecht v. Gillman,9 5 where the vomit-inducing drug apomorphine was employed in an involuntary
aversive conditioning program. Inmates were injected with the
drug for "not getting up, for giving cigarettes against orders, for
talking, for swearing, or for lying."96 After injections the inmates were exercised and would vomit for a period lasting from
fifteen minutes to an hour. Rejecting the state's contention that
the program was "treatment" and as such insulated from
eighth amendment scrutiny, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the program constituted cruel and unusual punishment when administered without informed consent. In Mackey v. Procunier,97 the Ninth Circuit similarly
applied the eighth amendment to prohibit the use of succinycholine-a paralyzing drug that produces sensations of suffocation and drowning-on fully conscious prisoners in an
aversive conditioning program. Other courts have found eighth
amendment violations in the involuntary administration of
98
psychotropic drugs in state hospitals and juvenile facilities.
Nonetheless, it is readily conceivable that some forms of
"therapy" may not sufficiently shock the conscience to trans93. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
94. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (eighth amendment prohibits
penalties that "transgress today's 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, critical standards, humanity, and decency' ") (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
95. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
96. Id. at 1137.
97. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
98. See Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Pena v. New York Div. for Youth,
419 F. Supp. 203, 207-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455
(N.D. Ind. 1972), aFd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
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gress the eighth amendment standard 99 but may still constitute
impermissible invasions of first amendment and privacy rights.
Moreover, carefully crafted programs could be designed to appear less punishment-oriented and more therapeutic, thus
making application of the eighth amendment questionable. In
Bell v. Wolfish,100 for example, the Supreme Court implied that
the eighth amendment inquiry may turn not on the effect of the
intervention, but on the intent with which it is administered.
Although the Court agreed that, under the due process clause,
a pretrial detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt, it held that not every disability imposed during
pretrial detention amounts to "punishment" within the meaning of the Constitution. In language that seems equally applicable in the eighth amendment context, the Court discussed
what "punishment" means in the constitutional sense:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose
of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose .... Absent a showing of an expressed intent
to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination
generally will turn on "[w]hether an alternative purpose to which [the
restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].".. . Thus, if a particular condition or restriction... is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not,
without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if a restriction or
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of
the governmental action is punishment .... 101

By stressing their rehabilitative functions, a court, applying the
Wolfish analysis, could find that aversive stimuli applied in a
clinical behavior therapy program serve a legitimate governmental purpose other than punishment. 102 The Court's "purpose" approach, however, will not prevent even treatment
procedures from being considered punishment when applied in
prison disciplinary contexts-the purpose for which the procedure is used, not its effects, will be decisive.
Even if a technique is claimed to be for treatment purposes, however, certain potent aversive stimuli could be considered sufficiently excessive or severe, in relationship to the
objectives of the rehabilitation program and in view of the
99. See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958).
100. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
-101. Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
102. Cf. Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary
Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 701, 71722 (1980) (arguing that the eighth amendment should apply broadly to medical
treatment involving inmates).
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availability of other less drastic conditioners, to be deemed
punishment for eighth amendment purposes. Lower federal
courts in cases decided before Bell v. Wolsh have employed
the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause
to condemn a variety of extreme practices that were sought to
be justified as rehabilitation, 0 3 and the Woish opinion clearly
leaves this possibility open. It is also possible that therapeutic
approaches which are totally ineffective as treatment will be
still considered punishment;104 ineffective techniques are "arbitrary or purposeless" and "not reasonably related to a legitimate goal [other than punishment]," justifying an inference
that the government's purpose was punishment.105 In any
event, these difficulties with applying the eighth amendment
severely limit its utility as a source of constitutional restriction
on correctional therapy.
Finally, the free exercise of religion clause may create a
right to refuse treatments in at least some circumstances. In
Winters v. Miller, 0 6 a Christian Scientist who objected to the
administration of psychotropic medication at a state mental
hospital to which she had been involuntarily committed was
held entitled to bring a damages action for violation of her right
to freedom of religion under the first amendment. A similar
claim by a prisoner was rejected, however, when the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that he was a sincere adherent of an es07
tablished religion that prohibited the use of such drugs.l
Thus, important as this right may be, the broad scope of prisoners' rights will not turn on the free exercise clause.
Im.

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT EXAMINED

It is neither helpful nor appropriate to analyze rehabilitation techniques by postulating a broad right to refuse treatment. Although the various forms of rehabilitation may
present certain common legal questions, they differ in ways
that are significant to constitutional analysis. Certain rehabilitation techniques, for example, may implicate first amendment
103. See note 98 supra. See also Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th
Cir. 1973); Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1972); Inmates of Boys'
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1365 (D.R.L 1972).
104. See Schwitzgebel, Limitations on the Coercive Treatment of Offenders,
8 CraM. L. BuLL. 267, 305 (1972).
105. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
106. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). Accord, In re
Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979).
107. See Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D. Kan. 1978).
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or privacy rights but not other constitutional guarantees. Some
may not present sufficient physical or mental intrusion to violate any constitutional prohibition, but may nonetheless require that some kind of hearing or other procedure be afforded
before they may be applied. 0 8 For constitutional purposes, a
certain threshold of intrusiveness may be posited that must be
exceeded before the various constitutional rights come into
consideration. Different thresholds, defined by reference to the
nature and effects of the technique used, may be necessary to
trigger different constitutional provisions.

A. A CONTINUUM OF INTRUSIVENESS
It is useful to construct a continuum of intrusiveness along
which the various rehabilitative techniques may be roughly
classified. Only at certain points on the continuum will certain
of the constitutional provisions be implicated. Even for these
techniques that present sufficient intrusiveness to merit constitutional consideration, there may be instances in which the
governmental interest is sufficiently important to outweigh the
offender's assertion of a constitutional right to resist treatment.
If a therapy invades a fundamental right, the government may
also have to satisfy the "least restrictive alternative" principle,
which in this context would require demonstration that the
proposed therapy is generally necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental interest and that no less intrusive alternative exists.109
In constructing a continuum of treatments, the key variables are the extent of physical or mental intrusion accompanying application of the technique; the nature, extent, and
duration of the treatment's effects; and the extent to which
these effects may be avoided or resisted by unwilling subjects." 0 Although the continuum will provide a general frame108. See text accompanying notes 317-476 infra.
109. See notes 238-68 infra and accompanying text.
110. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTr
ONAL LAW 911-12 (1978); Shapiro,
supra note 24, at 262; Note, supra note 10, at 619-20. A partial but by no means
exhaustive list of the therapeutic characteristics or effects that seem relevant
to the inquiry-having in common perhaps no more than that, in varying degrees, reasonable subjects would find them repugnant-includes the extent to
which the technique (a) causes pain; (b) produces harmful side effects of any
kind; (c) causes irreversible organic damage; (d) invades bodily or psychological privacy; (e) involves deprivations of amenities to which the subject is usually entitled; (f) involves procedures that are perceived as embarrassing or
degrading; and (g) produces annoyance, frustration, anger, fear, anxiety or
boredom. Needless to say, some of these features will be perceived as more repugnant than others, and the degree of repugnance will vary with the specific
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work for analyzing the constitutional issues, it will be rather
rough and oversimplified since the placement of any particular
therapy may turn on empirical questions concerning the effects
of the technique and the ability of the offender to resist these
effects-questions that remain in some cases unresolved, untested, or perhaps untestable. Moreover, the ranking of therapies along the continuum requires value judgments concerning
which effects are more or less offensive both to the relevant
constitutional values and to the individual offender. Nevertheless, for purposes of analyzing whether a particular therapy
creates a sufficient threshold of intrusiveness to implicate a
fundamental constitutional right, judges will have to weigh
these considerations on as objective a scale as is possible.
Once such a threshold has been found to be met, however, the
subjective value preferences of individual offenders will become significant in applying the least restrictive alternative
principle."'
The necessary categorization of therapies is itself problematic. Traditional categories are used for purposes of simplification, but these categories may contain treatments with varying
degrees of intrusiveness. For example, some of the behavioral
techniques can be viewed as more intrusive than some of the
psychotropic medications; others can be viewed as less intrusive than most forms of verbal therapy. Thus, because the
broad categories below substantially overlap, attention should
be focused on the effects of the particular technique employed
rather than on its place within a general therapeutic category.
1.

Verbal Rehabilitative Techniques

This lower end of the intrusiveness continuum is comprised of the most common rehabilitative approaches-educational or vocational programs, counselling, and individual or
group psychotherapy. The focus of these techniques is some
kind of verbal or nonverbal communication between the offender and a teacher, counselor, or therapist. Although these
techniques may create substantial opportunities for offenders
who seek to change their behavior, those who seek to resist
such interventions, but who must participate on an involuntary
nature of the technique applied, the duration of its effects, and the individual
value preferences of the subject. The term "intrusiveness" is thus a stipulated
term intended to capture a roughly weighted sum of these features, and is accordingly an inherently inexact measure that will vary with individual value
preferences and the assessments of judges and other decision-makers.
111. See text accompanying notes 219-23, 238-68 infra.
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basis, seem readily able to frustrate these approaches and
avoid their effects simply by withholding cooperation.
Even psychotherapy, which may have a massive impact on
a patient's mental processes and can be used as a potent
means of behavior control," 2 tends to work slowly, affording
the patient time to contemplate the meaning of behavior
change and to accept or resist such change." 3 There is wide
agreement that psychotherapy is usually not effective unless
the patient participates voluntarily and genuinely seeks
change." 4 This view was confirmed for correctional psychotherapy by a recent review of thirteen studies of psychotherapy
in institutional and community settings, which concluded that
such therapy is more likely to be effective "when the subjects
are amenable to treatment rather than nonamenable."" 5 Moreover, even a generally cooperative patient can avoid the gradual
effects of therapy with a minimal degree of mental resistance:
"[I] n the psychotherapy scheme one may go through treatment
as a form of game playing, such as showing up for appointments and even making verbal utterances, in the absence of
the type and degree of commitment required for a meaningful
6
therapeutic relationship.""
Certainly if a patient in psychotherapy can resist or avoid
the effects of this technique at will, an offender can even more
easily avoid the intrusions of the general "counseling" provided
by counselors who lack the professional abilities of one administering "psychotherapy." Educational and vocational programs are no more effective or intrusive for those disinterested
in learning. In fact, much inmate participation in educational
programs may be motivated by little more than the desire to
"chalk-up attendance marks so as to satisfy The Man on the Pa112. See Rogers & Skinner, Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human
Behavior, 124 Sc. 1057, 1063 (1956).
113. See Halleck, Legal and Ethical Aspects of Behavior Control, 131 AM. J.
PSYCH. 381, 381 (1974); see generally Michels, Ethical Issues of Psychological
and PsychotherapeuticMeans of Behavior Control: Is the Moral ContractBeing
Observed, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (April 1973).
114. See N. MoRRs, supra note 1, at 17; Katz, The Right to Treatment-An
Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L REV. 755, 776-77 (1969). A recent review of studies involving involuntarily committed patients, juvenile offenders,
and adult prisoners subjected to psychotherapy concluded that "the evidence
for the effectiveness of traditional psychotherapeutic methods for the reduction
of antisocial behavior is not very persuasive." Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CAL. L. REV. 936, 946 (1974).
115. D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WIKS, supra note 2, at 213.
116. COMM. ON PSYCHIATRY & LAW OF THE GRouP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, PsYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30s TO THE

80s 889 (1977).
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7

role Board.""1
Even the strong verbal exhortation of prison inmates, bordering on threats of physical abuse and typical of direct confrontation-style programs, such as the Juvenile Awareness
Project at Rahway State Prison portrayed in the film "Scared
Straight", are within the complete power of the listener to accept or reject." 8 Prison confinement may itself produce
profound changes in attitude and behavior. Nevertheless, confinement alone, whatever its effects on mental processes, is not
thought to violate the first amendment or other constitutional
guarantees." 9 This is so in part for reasons that apply as well
to verbal rehabilitative approaches-the changes in attitude
and behavior they produce, if any, are gradual and capable of
being resisted.
We speak of prisoners who "take advantage" of these rehabilitative programs, implying that the choice is largely voluntary. Although the presumed rewards of participation may be
difficult to resist, participation in verbal rehabilitative efforts
does not ensure accomplishment of program goals, particularly
20
for those prisoners for whom participation is a mere facade.1
Thus, even if the rewards appear to coerce participation, the
prisoner is still free to reject any substantial intrusion or permanent change in his or her mental processes.
Only two reported decisions have involved challenges to
the involuntary application of purely verbal techniques; both
suits arose from compulsory attendance at prison education
classes in Arkansas. In Rutherford v. Hutto,121 the prisoner
claimed compulsory attendance violated rights protected by the
first amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. The prison school
required eight hours of attendance one day a week; classes
117. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 45.

118. Two evaluations of the Juvenile Awareness Project bear out this observation. J. Finckenhauer & J. Storti, Juvenile Awareness Project Help: Evaluation Report No. 1 (1979) (unpublished); J. Finckenhauer, Juvenile Awareness
Project Evaluation Report No. 2 (April 18, 1979) (unpublished). Completed
under the auspices of the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice, the
evaluations compared attitude and behavior changes in a group of juveniles
who had attended the Project with a control group who had not. The results
were mixed, with no significant changes in attitude or behavior shown conclusively to be due to participation in the Project Thus it would seem that the
participants were able to accept or reject what the program offered, with no
profound changes occurring in participants.
119. See L. TRIE, supra note 110, at 911.
120.

STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 97-98.

121.

377 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
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were ungraded, and students were permitted to move along at
their own pace. The court noted that "no particular pressure
[is] put on any student to achieve or to achieve at any particular rate. No sanctions are imposed if a student performs
poorly."' 22 Although it noted that an inmate "cannot be forced
to learn," the court concluded that the state may "lead the
horse to water even though it knows that the horse cannot be
made to drink."123 In view of the state's authority to compel
the performance of uncompensated labor, the court could find
nothing constitutionally objectionable in compelling participation in the school program. Declaring there is no "constitutional right to be ignorant" or "to remain uneducated," the
24
court rejected the prisoner's constitutional challenge.1
In the second Arkansas prison education case, Jackson v.
McLemore,125 a prisoner was placed in segregated confinement
for refusing his teacher's order to spell certain words. The district court dismissed the complaint, which had asserted a "constitutional right to be let alone," and the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed.12 6 Expressing agreement with the
approach taken in Rutherford, the circuit court stressed that
"[i]t would defeat the purpose of rehabilitation if access to [rehabilitative] programs could be at the option of the prisoner."1 27 The court limited its holding to the type of
rehabilitative program before it, however, finding that no showing had been made that the program was "being purposefully
used to infringe upon protected constitutional rights."128 Moreover, the court indicated that although a prisoner may be required to participate in the school program, a prisoner "may
not be punished simply because he failed to learn, either
29
through inability or lack of motivation."'
A 1952 Supreme Court case, involving a captive audience of
a quite different kind, suggests that unwanted verbal exhorta122. Id. at 271.
123. Id. at 272.
124. Id.
125. 523 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1975).
126. Id. at 840.
127. Id. at 839.
128. Id. Although not mentioned by the court, one constitutional limitation
on such programs and general rehabilitation efforts would prohibit offenders
from being required to affirm their belief in any officially held view on a matter
of religion, politics, or opinion. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15
(1977); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-24 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425, 435 (1962); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
129. 523 F.2d at 839.
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tions may not create constitutional difficulties.1 30 A transit
company regulated by an agency of the District of Columbia installed FM radios in its buses and streetcars, and broadcast
special programs consisting of 90% music, 5% news, and 5%
commercial advertising. Two passengers protested in the federal courts, but the Supreme Court rejected their claim that, as
captive auditors, their first amendment or fifth amendment privacy rights had been violated.'13 Although public buses and
public prisons have little in common, the effects of mandatory
"verbal programming," in terms of the listener's ability to resist, are nonetheless substantially similar.
Thus, it may be concluded that the typical prison or community rehabilitative program involving largely verbal approaches violates neither a first amendment right to be free of
interference with mental processes nor a due process right to
privacy. Of course, if new verbal techniques are developed that
are so sophisticated in their application that mental processes
and attitudes may be changed without the subject's cooperation, the analysis would probably differ. The typical verbal program will also fail to violate the eighth amendment, both
because such programs do not seem to be "punishment,"'132 and
130. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
131. Id. at 461-63. The dissent emphasized the "right to be left alone" and
contended that subjecting a captive audience to the radio program violated its
right to privacy:
The present case involves a form of coercion to make people listen....
One who tunes in on an offensive program at home can turn it off
or tune in another station, as he wishes. One who hears disquieting or
unpleasant programs in public places, such as restaurants, can get up
and leave. But the man on the streetcar has no choice but to sit and
listen, or perhaps to sit and try not to listen.
When we force people to listen to another's ideas, we give the
propagandist a powerful weapon.
Id. at 468-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The prisoner is certainly more of a captive audience than the streetcar passenger who is always free to leave the
streetcar if he finds the radio message offensive. Yet the Supreme Court has
more recently recognized that even the radio listener at home, whom Mr. Justice Douglas noted was free to turn off an offensive program, may have his privacy invaded by the mere fact of the program's broadcast:
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior
warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid further offense by
turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying
that the remedy for an assault is to run away from the first blow. One
may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give
the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already
taken place.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
132. Friedman, supra note 72, at 63. See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn.
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because, even if considered punishment, these approaches
would not qualify as "cruel and unusual": they are not "so bad
as to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people." 133
Finally, although religious objections to participation in
such programs may present closer questions, successful challenges on these grounds will be rare. The offender must be opposed to the verbal program on genuinely religious grounds,
not merely philosophical or personal ones, and must demonstrate both the sincerity of his or her beliefs and that they are
134
essential to the practice of the religion involved.
2. Behavioral Techniques
Somewhat higher on the continuum of intrusiveness than
the verbal techniques are the behavioral approaches that are
being utilized with increasing frequency in prison and community-based programs. Behavior therapy, often called behavior
modification, involves clinical application of experimentally
derived principles of psychological learning theory, using systematic manipulation of the environment to teach adaptive behavior or modify maladaptive behavior. 3 5 Although still
controversial, behavioral approaches are now in wide use in a
variety of institutional and noninstitutional settings and show
36
considerable promise in the treatment of diverse problems.1
Behavioral approaches include positive reinforcement-the
provision of rewards or reinforcers on the occurrence of behav250, 255-56, 239 N.W.2d 905, 909 (1976) (unconsented electroconvulsive therapy
administered for treatment would not constitute punishment for eighth amendment purposes). See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
133. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (D. Ark. 1970), affid, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
134. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (holding that, in
view of the central role of religion in Amish belief, Amish had right to keep
their children out of a compulsory school program); IL TRIBE, supra note 110, at
859-65. Compare Winter v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 985 (1971) with Sconiers v. Jarvis, 458 F. Supp. 37 (D. Kan. 1978).
135.

See B. BROWN, L. WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION:

PERSPECTIVES ON A CURRENT ISSUE 3 (1975); Brady, Behavior Therapy, in 2
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1824 (A. Freedman, H. Kaplan & B.
Sadock eds. 2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK];
Shah, Basic Principles and Concepts, in CORRECTIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND
TREATMENT 123, 129-32 (Am. Correctional Ass'n Comm. on Classification &
Treatment 1975).
136. See B. BROWN, L WIENCKOWSI & S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 3. See
also RESEARCH TASK FORCE OF THE NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, RESEARCH
IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH 325-26 (1975) (discussing the increase in be-

havior modification research and training).
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ioral responses sought to be established or strengthened; 137

on the
aversion therapy-the application of unpleasant stimuli 38
occurrence of inappropriate or maladaptive behavior1 systematic desensitization-an attempt to reduce maladaptive
anxiety reactions by gradually exposing the patient to the anxiety-generating situation paired with relaxation;139 as well as a
variety of other techniques.
Two of the positive reinforcement techniques, the token
economy 40 and the tier system,141 have been used frequently
in adult and juvenile institutions as well as in alternative community-based programs. In the token economy, the subject receives tokens as rewards for instances of desired behavior and
the tokens may be exchanged for various items or privileges
that otherwise are unavailable. Inappropriate behavior results
in the loss of tokens. A 1974 survey revealed that 14 states utilized token economy systems in their prisons. 42 The Federal
Bureau of Prisons has also used token economies in the treatment of delinquents at two of its facilities.143
A variation on the token economy, the tier system, grants
privileges on the basis of the prisoner's place in a system of
tiers. The inmate earns his or her way from an orientation
level, where privileges are scant or nonexistent, upwards
137. See A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 217-92 (1969);
B. BROWN, L. WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 4-6.
138. See B. BROWN, L. WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 6-8; S.
RACHMAN & J. TEASDALE, AVERSION THERAPY AND BEHAVIOR DISORDERS:

AN

ANALYSIS xii (1969).
139. See A. BANDURA, supra note 137, at 424-500; B. BROWN, L WIENCKOWSKI
& S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 8-9.
140. See generally T. AYLLON & N. AZRIN, THE TOKEN ECONOMY, A MOTIVATIONAL SYSTEM FOR THERAPY AND REHABIIxrATION (1968); A. KAZDIN, THE TOKEN
ECONOMY: A REVIEW AND EVALUATION (1977); Wexler, supra note 83.
141. See Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 344 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (project
START); Carlson, Behavior Modification in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1
NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 155, 159-63 (1974); Wexler, supra note 83, at 87-88.
142. See Blatte, State Prisonsand the Use of Behavior Control, 4 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 11 (Sept. 1974). See generally Geler, Johnson, Hamlin & Kennedy, Behavior Modification in a Prison, 4 CRim. JUST. & BEHAVIOR 11 (1977);
Milan & McKee, The Cellblock Token Economy: Token Reinforcement Procedures in a Maximum Security CorrectionalInstitutionfor Adult Male Felons, 9
J. APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 253 (1976); Petrock & Walter, Behavior Modifca-

tion in Corrections: Implicationsfor OrganizationalChange, 1 NEW ENG. J.
PRISON L. 203 (1974).
143. See Carlson, supra note 141, at 158-59. A community-based residential
treatment home for court-involved delinquents in Kansas-Achievement Place,
which utilizes a token economy and other behavioral procedures, has been
widely copied. See Phillips, Phillips, Fixsen & Wolf, Achievement Place: Modification of the Behaviors of Pre-delinquent Boys Within a Token Economy, 4 J.
APPLIED BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 45 (1971).
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through a ranked series of tiers with increasingly more desirable privileges and conditions. This model was utilized in the
controversial Federal Bureau of Prisons' Project START. In
that program the prisoners at entry level were denied such basic privileges as daily showers, exercise, visitors, reading matter, personal property and commissary privileges-all of which
could be regained only by behaving in conformity with program
goals.144 Project START, although discontinued by the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, is being used as a model for other prison
5
programs.14
A 1974 survey indicated that at least seven state prison systems used aversive conditioning in their corrections therapy.146
More extreme examples have been the use of succinycholine, a
paralyzing drug, in a California prison program,14 7 and a program for child molesters in a Connecticut prison which paired
electric shocks to the prisoner's groin area with arousal experienced while viewing slides of naked children.148 Thus, concern
related to behavioral approaches is not speculative. Token
economy programs, tier programs, and aversive conditioning
programs have been applied on an involuntary basis in prisons
and community settings, and some commentators have urged
their increased use on a coercive basis for offenders, arguing
that by violating the law, the offender has forfeited any right to
49
an "antisocial personality."1
To classify these behavioral techniques on the continuum
of intrusiveness, one must consider the extent of physical or
mental intrusions accompanying their application; the nature,
extent, and duration of their effects; and the extent to which
these effects may be resisted by unwilling subjects.150 Yet
proper classification is particularly difficult because behavioral
144. See Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 344 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Carlson, supra note 141, at 159-63. Because the reinforcer frequently used in the
tier program is. the removal of unpleasant conditions, it may more aptly be
termed a program of negative reinforcement. See Shah, supra note 135, at 128.
Another controversial program using a tier system is Maryland's Patuxent Institute for "defective delinquents." Editors Commentary to Patuxent Institute,
5 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. v-vi (1977) (symp. issue).
145. See Gaylin & Blatte, Behavior Modification in Prisons, 13 AM. CRIm. L.
REV. 11, 25 (1975).
146. Blatte, supra note 142, at 11.
147. See Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1973).
148. See Wolfe & Marino, A Programof Behavior Treatmentfor Incarcerated
Pedophiles, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 69, 77-78 (1975).
149. McConnell, Stimulus/Response: CriminalsCan be Brainwashed-Now,
3 PSYCH. TODAY 14, 74 (Nov. 1970).
150. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
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techniques differ substantially in regard to these factors. Some
aversive techniques, such as the use of drugs that cause nausea
or apnea, or electric shocks, involve direct, substantial physical
intrusion. Other techniques, however, such as forfeiture of
privileges, verbal disapproval, or isolated confinements, are not
at all physically intrusive. The techniques utilizing positive reinforcement do not involve physical intrusions, nor do they
present serious mental intrusions any greater than, for exam5
ple, psychotherapy.'1
The effects of behavioral techniques are the first point for
analysis, particularly in terms of the extent and duration of
their impact on subjects. Although the empirical evidence is
far from clear, a large number of case studies report strikingly
high success rates with behavioral techniques in the treatment
of a wide variety of conditions. 5 2 As with psychotherapy, however, there is evidence that behavioral treatment works only
with cooperative patients and that successful treatment cannot
be forced on patients against their will.15 3 Although conditioning techniques are frequently protrayed as having the dramatic
power to induce change automatically without the cooperation
of the subject, 5 4 these techniques do not in fact have such
powerful effects.
Rather than occurring automatically, conditioning is now
thought to be "cognitively mediated." Albert Bandura, a leading behaviorist, has dispelled the "mechanistic metaphor" long
associated with the process of conditioning:
Explanations of reinforcement originally assumed that consequences
increase behavior without conscious involvement. The still prevalent
notion that reinforcers can operate insidiously arouses fears that improved techniques of reinforcement will enable authorities to manipulate people without their knowledge or consent. Although the
empirical issue is not yet completely resolved, there is little evidence
that rewards function as automatic strengtheners of human conduct
....
After individuals discern the instrumental relationship between
action and outcome, contingent rewards may produce accommodating
or oppositional behavior depending on how they value the incentives,
the influencers and the behavior itself, and how others respond. Thus
reinforcement, as it has become better understood, has changed from a
mechanical strengthener of conduct to an informative and motivating

151. See R. SCHWrrZGEBEi, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ENFORCED TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS 66 (1979) (contending that behavioral techniques are less intrusive
on mental processes than the verbal techniques).
152. See B. BROWN, L. WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 10-11.
153. See E. ERWIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY: SCIENCIC, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND
MORAL FOUNDATIONS 180-81 (1978); Marks, The Current Status of Behavioral
Psychotherapy: Theory and Practice, 133 Am. J. PsYcH. 253, 255 (1976).
154. See, e.g., A. BURGEss, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1963).
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155

Reinforcers, then, may be regarded as "motivators," depending
for their success on the "incentive preferences of those undergoing change." 5 6 Certainly there are reinforcers so desirable
and aversive stimuli so unpleasant that few would feel able to
resist, whatever their incentive preferences. However, correctional programs are not likely to use aversive stimuli so distressing that offenders will find it impossible to avoid behavior
change-particularly after the strongly negative publicity surrounding the abuses involved in recent cases and the consistent judicial condemnation of these practices in prison aversive
157
programs.
More politically palatable positive reinforcement methods
are more likely to be used. Certainly some inmates may find
some of these reinforcements too tantalizing to resist-color
TV, air conditioning, better physical conditions, monetary rewards, or the approval of the parole board, for example. Yet it
is doubtful that these inducements to change would trigger
constitutional condemnation. Society outside of prisons is pervaded by governmental incentives designed to induce a variety
of behaviors. 5 8 Even within the prison, inmates are granted
credit toward parole for good conduct and participation in rehabilitative programs as "a tangible reward for positive efforts
made during incarceration." 5 9 Although in each case rewards
are provided by the government with the explicit purpose of inducing or reinforcing certain behavior, few would contend that
these positive reinforcements jeopardize constitutional privacy
or first amendment freedom of thought.160 Although the use of
reinforcers in a structured behavior modification program may
induce behavior change more effectively than outside such an
environment, it is difficult to see how an offender who decides
155.

Bandura, Behavior Therapy and the Models of Man, 29 AM. PSYCH. 859,

860 (1974).
156. Id. at 862.
157. See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); Mackey v.
Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
158. To note just a few of these incentives, businessmen are offered an investment tax credit, and army recruits are given bonuses and other incentives
to induce their enlistment.

159.

17 N.Y.C.R.R. § 260.1(a) (1974).

160. There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity
consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977).
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to alter behavior in order to obtain a color TV or other reward
could argue that any constitutional rights have been violatedat least where the rewards are not those basic rights or privileges that are constitutionally guaranteed to all.161 Moreover,
there is considerable evidence that whatever effects positive reinforcement may have, these effects are short-lived, and perhaps restricted to the controlled clinical setting in which
62
conditioning occurs.1
Positive reinforcement procedures involving substantial entry-level deprivations may merit different treatment, however.
Token economies and tier systems, for example, sometimes
make basic personal requirements available contingent upon
behavior that conforms with program goals. 6 3 Recent decisions which hold that the Constitution requires minimum conditions and standards for prisoners, 64 severely limit the use of
these basic rights and privileges as reinforcers in positive reinforcement programs. Moreover, administrative regulations,
such as those of the Federal Bureau of Prisons specifying minimum conditions and privileges for prisoners,165 may also
render such reinforcers legally unavailable in token or tier programs.
Thus, although positive reinforcement techniques may be
more difficult to resist than those employing only verbal approaches, they do not appear to work in such a direct and intru161. See notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text. Where token economies or tier programs start offenders off in a situation of severe deprivation
that may be remedied only by behavior in conformity with program goals, the
reinforcers used may indeed be irresistible. See Shah, supra note 135, at 127
("[T] he old saying that you can take a horse to water but you cannot get him to
drink, is not necessarily correct. If the horse were fed salt, or allowed to stand
in the sun and went without water for a while, one could indeed get him to
drink.").
162. See B. BROWN, L. WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 7; Gruber, Behavior Therapy: Problems in Generalization,2 BEHAVIOR THERAPY 361,
361-78 (1971). This is particularly true for offenders released in a community in
which the contingencies of reinforcement are quite different from those within
the prison or community setting in which they were conditioned. See Budd &
Baer, BehaviorModification and the Law: Implications of Recent JudicialDecisions, 4 J. PsycH. & L. 171, 205 (1976).
163. See Wexler, supra note 83, at 84-90.
164. E.g., James v. Wallace, 533 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1976). See Wexler, supra
note 83, at 93-95. An offender wishing to participate in a behavioral program involving the use of basic rights or privileges as reinforcers, provided the conditions of informed consent are satisfied, should, however, be able to waive his or
her right to resist such a program and consent to at least the temporary withholding of such privileges. See notes 269-315 infra and accompanying text. See
also Budd & Baer, supra note 162, at 205.
165. 28 C.F.R. §§ 540-551 (1979).
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sive fashion as to deprive the offender of effective control over
his or her own behavior. In view of the ability of the subject to
resist behavioral approaches that utilize positive reinforcement, it seems unlikely that application of these techniques
without the offender's consent will be found to violate either
the first amendment right to be free of interference with mental
processes or the right of privacy. Nor could these techniques
be viewed as involving cruel and unusual punishment.
The aversive techniques present greater difficulties. First,
some of the aversive techniques may inflict serious damage on
patients, including "pain, frustration, increased aggressiveness,
arousal, general and specific anxieties, somatic and physiological malfunctions, and development of various unexpected and
often pathological operant behaviors."166 An extreme example
is use of the drug succinycholine in an aversive conditioning
7
The
program, which was condemned in Mackey v. Procunier.16
drug, characterized as a "breath-stopping and paralyzing 'fright
drug,'" resulted in the prisoner-subject regularly suffering
"nightmares in which he relives the frightening experience and
awakens unable to breathe."168 These allegations of mental intrusion and effect were sufficient for the court to rule that the
prisoner's complaint raised serious constitutional questions of
69
"impermissible tinkering with the mental processes."1
Several aversive techniques could constitute cruel and unusual punishment170 inasmuch as some of them are identical to
prohibited punitive sanctions. Social isolation, for example, is
the functional equivalent of the strip-rooms and solitary confinement condemned as violating the eighth amendment in a
number of cases.l 71 Administration of electric shocks to the
body, sometimes used in aversive programs, also has been considered cruel and unusual when used for prison discipline. 72
The mild slapping used in some aversive programs seems little
166. Bucher & Lovas, Use of Aversive Stimulation in BehaviorModification,
in Mim SYMPOSIUM ON THE PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR, 1967: AvERsrvE STmIULA-

TION 77, 78 (M. Jones ed. 1968).
167. 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973). See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
168. 477 F.2d at 877.
169. Id. at 878.
170. See Note, Aversion Therapy: Punishment as Treatment and Treatment
as Cruel and Unusual Punishment,49 S. CAi L REV. 880 (1976).
171. See, e.g., LaReau v. MacDougal, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 894-95 (N.D. Miss.
1972), a.Od, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Inmates of Boys Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366-67 (D.RIL 1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621, 648 (E.D. Va. 1971).
172. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 900 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd,
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different than the corporal punishment held to be cruel and unusual punishment in prison and juvenile cases. 173 Some of
these techniques are thus sufficiently offensive to prevailing
standards of decency to implicate eighth amendment concerns.
However, if employed for therapeutic or rehabilitative purposes, they may not, under the Supreme Court's approach in
Bell v. Woftsh,174 be considered "punishment" in the constitutional sense, at least if not considered excessive in view of the
availability of less drastic conditioners.
Except for use of these extremely intrusive stimuli, however, aversive techniques generally are like the other behavioral and even verbal approaches. For example, aversive
17 5
Altechniques seem ineffective with uncooperative subjects.
though changes in behavior of brief duration may be accomplished through these techniques by inducing the cooperation
of the offender, absent the offender's willingness, there is little
evidence that such changes will persist outside the coercive
setting. 176 Any behavioral changes accomplished against the
offender's will are thus impermanent and reversible. In this respect, the behavioral approaches are quite distinct from the
more direct, physically and mentally intrusive organic techniques, which do not depend for their effects on the subject's
cooperation.
Although some of the techniques may involve intrusions on
privacy, mere discomfort not involving bodily intrusion has
been found insufficient to implicate the fundamental right of
privacy in a related context. In Bell v. Wofish,177 the Supreme
Court rejected a due process challenge to the practice of
"double-bunking" in pretrial detention, noting that "the detainee's desire to be free from discomfort... simply does not
rise to the level of those fundamental liberty interests delineated in [the Court's prior privacy cases].'u"78 Moreover, most of
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
173. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968); Nelson
v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 454 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affid, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va.
1971).
174. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
175. See Bandura, The Ethical and Social Purposes of Behavior Modification, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF BEHAVIOR THERAPY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 16 (C.
Franks & G. Wilson eds. 1975); Note, Aversion Therapy: Its Limited Potential
for Use in a CorrectionalSetting, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1327 (1974).
176. See B. BROWN, L.WIENCKOWSKI & S. STOLZ, supra note 135, at 14.
177. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
178. Id. at 530.

1981]

CORRECTIONAL THERAPY

these techniques, even if somewhat unpleasant, simply do not
invade the individual's freedom of thought or interfere with
mental processes in any irresistible, pervasive, or permanent
fashion.
Thus, both the more drastic aversive conditioners and the
use of basic rights and privileges as positive reinforcers appear
to be so intrusive of fundamental liberties that their constitutionality is doubtful. With these exceptions, however, rehabilitative programs employing behavioral techniques do not seem
significantly more intrusive than verbal techniques, absent the
development of sophisticated approaches able to effect behavioral and attitudinal change without the willingness of the subject.
3.

Organic Techniques

Far more intrusive than the behavioral or verbal techniques are the organic therapies, characterized by direct physical intervention into the body of the subject and by effects that
are incapable of being resisted. 179 In ascending order of intrusiveness, these organic techniques include medication, electroconvulsive therapy, electronic stimulation of the brain, and
surgical interventions such as castration for sex offenders and
psychosurgery.
a.

Psychotropic Medication

Virtually all prison rehabilitative programs using medication have involved the use of psychotropic drugs-compounds
affecting the mind, behavior, intellectual functions, perception,
moods, and emotions of the subject.180 One survey of correctional treatment studies reveals programs that have used Stimulants (dextro-amphetamine); antipsychotic drugs or "major
tranquilizers" (trifluoroperazine/Stelazine); antidepressant
drugs (nortriptyline/Aventyl); and other antianxiety drugs or
"minor tranquilizers" (diazepam/Valium).181 The coercive and
at times punitive use of these drugs in prison and alternate settings has been documented in the literature,182 in congressional
179.
180.

181.

See Katz, supra note 114, at 776-77; Shapiro, supra note 24, at 240-44.
See V. LONGO, NEUROPHARMOCOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 182 (1972).
D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WnKs, supra note 2, at 330, 479. For an

analysis of the different categories of psychotropic drugs and their effects, see
Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 769, 774-89.

182. See J. MrrFoRD, supra note 10, at 129. See generally Bomstein, The Forcible Administration of Drugs to Prisoners and Mental Patients, 9 CLEARING-
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studies, 183 and in cases.18 4 Some commentators have even advocated the use of long-acting tranquilizers implanted beneath
the skin of offenders-a means of "chemical incapacitation"--as
85
an alternative to prison.1
Most of these drugs intrude directly on mental processes.
Cognitive functions may be little affected once the subject has
become habituated to186 antipsychotic drugs, but in early periods of administration, the subject often experiences heavy sedation, clouding of consciousness, and impairment of
judgment. 8 7 Moreover, antipsychotic drugs are frequently accompanied by toxic reactions and adverse side effects, some of
which are quite serious and irreversible. These include autonomic reactions, disorders of the motor system (including
tardive dyskinesia, a persistent neurological syndrome for
which there is no known effective treatment), hypersensitivity
reactions, reported cases of sudden death, sedation, convulsions, metabolic, and endocrinologic changes, and a variety of
behavioral effects. 88 The antidepressant drugs produce simi89
lar, although less serious side effects.1
Thus, the"primary and side effects of many of these drugs
are both physically and mentally intrusive, occur rapidly, and
HOUSE REV. 379 (1975); Opton, supra note 10; Rundle, The Dilemma of a Prison
Doctor: Institution v. Ethics, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (Nov. 1972); Sitnick,
Major Tranquilizersin Prison, Drug Therapy and the Unconsenting Inmate, 11
WILLIAMETE L.J. 378 (1975).
183. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SEN.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1974).
184. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilson v. Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.
1973); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affid, 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
185. See Lehtinen, Controlling the Minds and Bodies of Prisoners-Without
Prisons, 6 BARRISTER 11, 54 (Fall 1979); Lehtinen, TechnologicalIncapacitation:
A Neglected Alternative, 2 Q.J. CORRECTIONS 31, 35-36 (1978).
186. See Solow, Drug Therapy of Mental Illness: Tranquilizers and Other
Depressants, in AN INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 289, 307 (R. Rech &
K. Moore eds. 1971).
187. See Jarvik, Drugs Used in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in
THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 151, 167 (L Goodman & A.
Gilman eds. 1970); Winick, supra note 181, at 783.
188. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 579-84
(1971); American College of Neuopsychopharmacology-Food and Drug Administration Task Force, Neurological Syndromes Associated with Antipsychotic
Drug Use: A SpecialReport, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH. 463 (1973); Davis & Cole,
Antipsychotic Drugs, in COMPREHENSIVE T=xTBOOK, supra note 135, at 1921,
1933-34; Jarvik, supra note 187, at 165; Winick, supra note 181, at 782.
189. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 188, at 602-06; Cole & Davis, AntidepressantDrugs, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOc, supra note 135, at 1941, 194448; Jarvik, supra note 187, at 174-86; Winick, supra note 181, at 786-89.
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are not capable of being resisted. Although the primary effects
of the drugs may last only several hours or days, the side effects of some last much longer and in some cases are irreversible. Not surprisingly, patients frequently consider the side
effects of at least some of these drugs highly unpleasant, pain90
ful, and debilitating.1 Psychotropic drugs must for all of these
reasons be considered more intrusive than the behavioral or
verbal approaches. Since bodily integrity is directly invaded by
forced medication in a way that cannot be considered de minimus, the fundamental constitutional right of privacy seems
clearly implicated. Moreover, because these drugs by definition
directly affect mental processes and intellectual functioning in
a way incapable of being resisted, the first amendment right to
be free of interference with mental processes is seriously invaded.
A number of cases involving civilly-committed mental patients support these constitutional implications by recognizing
a constitutional right of competent patients to refuse psychotropic medication. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has found that involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication may interfere with mental processes such that the
patient's first amendment right to freedom of speech and association is violated. 191 Moreover, that court has suggested that
under certain circumstances, the drugs may give rise to a claim
under the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause and may also violate a patient's constitutional "right to
bodily privacy."' 192 Another federal court, rejecting a first
amendment claim on the ground that "if forced medication is
otherwise proper, the temporary dulling of the senses accompanying it does not rise to the level of the First Amendment violations found in Kaimowitz," nevertheless found the
193 Other courts have
constitutional right of privacy violated.
found that the administration of medication over religious ob190. See generally Van Putten, Why do Schizophrenic Patients Refuse to
Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH. 67 (1974). See also T. DETRE & H.
JARECKI, supra note 188, at 602-06; Jarvick, supra note 187, at 183-86; Winick,
supra note 181, at 786.
191. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976). Accord, Rogers v. Okin,
478 F. Supp. 1342, 1366-67 (D. Mass. 1979) (the right to produce a thought), affd
in part, 28 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2397 (1st Cir. 1980).
192. Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3rd Cir. 1976).
193. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed,
Nos. 79-2576, 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1980). Other courts have also found that
voluntarily committed patients have a right to refuse treatment based on the
constitutional right to privacy. See Davis v. Hubbard, No. C73-205 (N.D. Ohio
1980), summarized at 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (1980); Rogers v. Okin,478 F. Supp. 1342,
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jections violates the first amendment right to free exercise of
religion.194 Finally, still other courts have held that the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs violates the eighth
amendment. 195 Clearly the punitive use of at least some of
these drugs would seem offensive to eighth amendment values,
although the use of minor tranquilizers such as valium may not
reach eighth amendment proportions because the effects associated with such drugs are considerably less distressing and
96
harmful.1
Thus, psychotropic medications are readily distinguishable
from all of the verbal and most of the behavioral approaches.
The drugs invariably represent physical invasions of the subject's bodily integrity, always effect a substantial change in the
subject's state of mind, and seriously risk long-term if not permanent changes in the personality or other mental functions of
the subject. Most importantly, when administered involuntarily, the effects and risks of these drugs are incapable of being
resisted.
b.

Electroconvulsive Therapy

Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), frequently called electroshock therapy, involves the passage of an electrical current
through the brain by means of electrodes applied to the patient's temples. 197 Muscle-relaxing drugs and anesthesia are
1365-66 (E.D. Mass. 1979), afid in part, 28 CRlM. L. Rpm. 2397 (1st Cir. 1980); In
re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1980).
194. See, e.g., Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
985 (1971); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979). A number of earlier cases involving forced psychotropic medication had rejected constitutional challenges,
broadly holding that administration of medical care over the objections of a
prisoner did not violate the Constitution; these cases, however, arose in one
federal district, which seemed to apply the now discredited "hands off" approach to prison litigation. See generally Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th
Cir. 1965); Smith v. Baker, 326 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Ramsey v. Ciccone,
310 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F. Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo.
1968). See also Sitnick, supra note 182, at 389; note 74 supra and accompanying
text. These cases generally have not been followed elsewhere.
195. See Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502-04 (D. Minn. 1974), affd in part & vacated in part,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind.
1972), affd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See generally TASK FORCE ON ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC As-

SOCIATION, ELECTROCONvuLSIVE THERAPY (1978); Symonds, supra note 102.
196. See notes 186-89 supra and accompanying text. Of course under Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), when the purpose of drug administration is therapeutic rather than disciplinary, the eighth amendment will not apply. See
notes 100-01 supra and accompanying text.
197. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 188, at 635-55; L. KALUNOWSKY &
P. HOCH, SoMATic

TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY 128-207 (1961).

See generally
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administered, the patient loses consciousness, and then experiences electrically induced convulsions. After regaining consciousness, the patient remains in a state of confusion and
disorientation for a period of time, and some patients claim
persisting confusion and loss of memory.198 Although the use
of ECT is usually restricted to the treatment of severe psychiatric depression, it has been used in prison programs' 99 and occa20 0
sionally for punitive purposes.
Coercive adminstration of ECT in prison and community
programs raises serious constitutional issues. The technique is
hazardous, 20 1 extremely intrusive both physically and mentally,
and incapable of being resisted by unwilling subjects. Moreover, its side effects are distressing and, at least in some cases,
memory is impaired in a way that may be irreversible. 202 As a
result, ECT seems clearly more intrusive than the verbal therapies or behavioral approaches, and is probably more intrusive
than at least most of the psychotropic drugs. An intrusion on
PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CoNvuLsivE THERAPY (M. Fink, S.

Kety, J. McGaugh & T.

Williams eds. 1974).
198. Some confusion and loss of memory occurs in virtually all cases. See
T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 188, at 641-44; Dornbush & Williams, Memory
and ECT, in PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY, supra note 197, at 199.
See generally Harper & Wiens, Electroconvulsive Therapy and Memory, 161 J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 245 (1975). Whether brain damage and permanent memory loss result from ECT is the subject of dispute. See RESEARCH
TASK FORCE OF THE NAT'L INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH 337 (1975); REPORT OF THE TASK PANEL ON RESEARCH,
IV TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON

MENTAL HEALTH 1761-62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK PANEL REPORTS].
199. See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILcs, supra note 2, at 330.
200.

See K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS: AMERICA'S IN-

CARCERATED CHILDREN 147 (1976); DiSpoldo, Arizona's 'Clockwork Orange' Bill,
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1974, at 39.
201. The risks and complications accompanying ECT have been greatly reduced by the use of muscle relaxing drugs, which prevent the violent muscular
contractions that had, in the past, frequently led to bone fractures and dislocations. T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 188, at 640-41; Hurwitz, Electroconvulsive Therapy: A Review, 15 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 303, 305 (1974).
However, ECT utilizing muscle relaxants presents risks including apnea, a temporary cessation of the breathing impulse some patients experience as a response to the drugs, chest-wall spasms, coughing, spasms of the larynx or the
windpipe, aspiration of foreign matter into the lungs, cardiac irregularities, and
allergic responses to the medication. Hurwitz, supra, at 305. These complications occur in only one out of every 2,600 treatments and are usually relatively
benign; they result in fatality, however, in about one out of every 28,000 applications. T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 188, at 640; Hurwitz, supra, at 306 (table summarizing mortality studies). An additional risk is the development of
psychotic symptoms, particularly for patients with schizoid or schizophrenicdisposing factors. See generally Elmore & Sugarman, Precipitationof Psychosis
During Electroshock Therapy, 36 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 115 (1975).
202. T. DETRE & H. JARECKi, supra note 188, at 643.
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the subject's constitutional right of bodily privacy is therefore
unarguably presented, and in view of ECT's impact on mental
processes and particularly on memory, this intrusion should
implicate the first amendment as well. Moreover, the punitive
use of ECT would raise serious problems under the eighth
amendment. A number of cases contesting the involuntary use
of ECT on mental patients have either banned ECT without informed consent or prescribed limitations and procedures gov203
erning its use.
c.

Surgical Interventions

Treatment employing direct surgical intervention-electronic stimulation of the brain, psychosurgery, and castration
for sex offenders, for example 20--ranks highest on the continuum of intrusiveness. Although rarely applied in prisons or alternative settings, these techniques, if performed without the
informed consent of the offender, pose serious constitutional
difficulties.
(1)

Electronic Stimulation of the Brain

Electronic stimulation of the brain (ESB) is a highly experimental technique that involves the surgical implantation of
minute electrodes into the brain. When charged, these electrodes stimulate the brain in ways that are designed to induce
205
Aldesired, or inhibit undesired, behaviors and sensations.
though this technique apparently has not as yet been used on
prisoners, there have been reports of its therapeutic use with
mental patients 206 and speculation as to its use in correctional
rehabilitation and parole. 207 One commentator has even sug203. See, e.g., Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), arffd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn.
520, 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976); Doe v. Klein, 143 N.J. Super. 1"34, 362 A.2d 1204
(1977); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335
N.Y.S.2d 461 (S. Ct., N.Y. County 1972).
204. For discussion of another type of surgical intervention for offendersplastic surgery-see Kurtzberg, Mandell, Lewin, Lipton & Shuster, PlasticSurgery on Offenders, in JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS 688-700 (N. Johnston ed. 1978).
205. See generally J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONraoL OF THE MIN: TOWARD A
PSYCHOCIVIUIZED SOCIETY (1969); E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF

BRAIN STIMULATION

AND PSYCHOSURGERY

(1973).

206. See Heath, Modulation of Emotion with a Brain Pacemaker,165 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 300, 300-17 (1977).
207. See Ingraham & Smith, The Use of Electronics in the Observation and
Control of Human Behavior and its Possible Use in Rehabilitationand Parole,
7 ISSUES IN CRmNOLOGY 35, 42-44 (Fall 1972).
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gested the use of ESB in conjunction with implanted radio telemetry devices to immobilize or incapacitate criminal
2 08
offenders.
Although no permanent change in the brain apparently results from implantation of the electrodes, 209 ESB is in such an
experimental stage that it must be regarded as hazardous and
unpredictable. Moreover it is extremely intrusive both physically and mentally, modifying the state of the brain itself in a
way beyond the control of the subject. Such a direct interference with mental processes certainly raises serious questions
under the first amendment as well as under the constitutional
right of privacy.
(2)

Castration

Another surgical intervention that is occasionally advocated or used for sex offenders is castration. 210 Involuntary
castration of offenders would be highly controversial, even if research should reveal that it is effective in the control of certain
types of sex crimes. Involuntary castration would clearly invade the constitutional right of bodily privacy and would also
interfere with the fundamental right to procreate, long protected by constitutional privacy. In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson,2 1 1 the Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds a state habitual criminal sterilization act, which
provided for compulsory sterilization following a third felony
conviction involving moral turpitude. In so doing, the Court
characterized the right to procreate as "one of the basic civil
208. See Lehtinen, Controlling the Minds and Bodies of Prisoners-Without
Prisons 6 BARRISTER 11, 11-12, 54 Lehtinen, TechnologicalIncapacitation:A Neglected Alternative, 2 Q.J. CORRECTIONS 31, 35. As an alternative to incarceration, such offenders would be electronically monitored and subjected to ESB
administered through an internal telemetry receiver when data suggested the
onset of dangerous behavior.
209. See J. DELGADo, supra note 205, at 84-85; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note
205, at 105.
210. See, e.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WINKs, supra note 2, at 290
(Danish habitual sex offender program); Klerman & Dworkin, Can Convicts
Consent to Castration?,5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (October 1975) (analyzing a
case in which two California child molesters, facing indeterminate sentences,
requested castration in the hope that the judge might consider probation);
Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Movement Toward Voluntary Treatment, 62
CAimF. L. REV. 671, 683 (1974) (discussing the case of a Colorado child molester
agreeing, during plea bargaining, to submit to castration); "Chemical Castration". Another Use for Depo-Provera,9 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10 (Aug. 1979)
("chemical castration" for sex offenders, utilizing depo-provera and a variety of
synthetic female hormones, which may cause permanent impotence).
211. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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rights of man.... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 212 If imposed as punishment, castration
might also be considered so shocking to the conscience of society as to violate the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments.
(3)

Psychosurgery

Psychosurgery would seem the most intrusive of all interventions discussed. Still an experimental procedure, it involves
the surgical removal or destruction of brain tissue with the intent of altering behavior.213 There have been some reports of
the use of psychosurgery on prisoners to control aggression,2 1 4
and its use has been advocated as a general means of managing
violent and aggressive behavior.215
Psychosurgery frequently results in intellectual deterioration, emotional blunting, and substantial physical risks.216 Following extensive expert testimony, one court catalogued the
adverse effects of psychosurgery as follows:
Psychosurgery flattens emotional responses, leads to lack of abstract
reasoning ability, leads to a lack of capacity for new learning and
causes general sedation and apathy. It can lead to impairment of memory and in some instances unexpected responses to psychosurgery are
observed. It has been found, for example, that heightened rage reaction can follow surgical intervention on the amygdala, just as placidity
2 17
can.
212. Id. at 541. Accord, Tulley v. Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 701-04, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 266, 270-71 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979).
213. See generally V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN (1970);
MODERN CONCEPTS IN PSYCHIATRIC SURGERY (R. Hitchcock, T. Ballantine & A.
Meyerson eds. 1979); OPERATING ON THE MIND: THE PSYCHOSURGERY CONFLICT
(W. Gaylin, J. Meister & R. Neville eds. 1975); THE PSYCHOSURGERY DEBATE:
SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES (E. Valenstein ed. 1980); S. SHUMAN, PSYCHOSURGERY AND THE MEDICAL CONTROL OF VIOLENCE: AUTONOIY AND

DEVIANCE (1977); E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 205; Symposium-Psychosurgery,
54 B.U.L. REV. 215 (1974).
214. See Shapiro, supra note 24, at 247 n.16. See also Breggin, The Second
Wave in Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentatior 1973: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 390, 393
(1973).
215. See generally V. MARK & F. ERVIN, supra note 213.
216. See Chorover, Psychosurgery: A Neuropsychological Perspective, 54
B.U.L. REV. 231, 247 (1974); Valenstein, The PracticeofPsychosurgery: A Survey
of the Literature (1971-1976), in NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN

SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Appendix to

PSYCHOSURGERY 1-56, 1-80 (1977).
217. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW, slip
op. at 17 (Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS,
supra note 63, at 909.
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Based on these findings, 2 18 it is difficult to quarrel with the
conclusion that involuntary psychosurgery would violate both
the constitutional right of privacy and the first amendment.
Moreover, if imposed as punishment, the eighth amendment
would seem to apply as well. In view of the potential for psychosurgery to severely impair intellectual and emotional capacities and to permanently alter personality in a way incapable of
being resisted by unwilling subjects, the procedure must be
considered the most physically and mentally intrusive of all
techniques surveyed.

B. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST AND SCRUTINY OF THE MEANS
EMPLOYED

Two conclusions may be reached from the foregoing analysis. First, because the verbal and many of the behavioral techniques are not seriously intrusive, do not result in longlasting
effects, and are readily capable of being resisted even when the
subject is nonconsenting, these techniques do not so infringe
on fundamental rights as to create a constitutional right to refuse the treatments. Second, the therapeutic interventions in
the higher range of the continuum do present significant, pervasive invasions of the subjects' minds and bodies with effects
that are often longlasting and always incapable of being
resisted when the subject is nonconsenting. When applied involuntarily, these techniques invade such fundamental constitutional rights as the first amendment right to be free from
interference with mental processes, the due process right of
privacy and the fundamental liberty interest associated with
bodily integrity.
Constitutional rights are not absolute, however, and even
fundamental rights must yield to government regulation advancing a "compelling state interest."2 19 Courts are required to
218. The National Commission, however, in its review of psychosurgery,
found the Kaimowitz court's conclusions concerning the hazards of the newer
psychosurgical procedures to be overstated. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,

PSYCHOSURGERY 22 (1977). Dr. Valenstein's review of the literature, conducted
for the National Commission, rejected the claim that psychosurgery does not
result in intellectual change, Valenstein, supra note 216, at 1-58, but concluded
that personality changes are "relatively infrequent and characterized as 'mild'
and 'transient,"' id. at 1-89, and that "[t] he risk of permanent adverse intellectual, emotional, and physical side effects is reported as minimal .. .in sharp
contrast to the results from the older lobotomy operations .... ." Id. at 1-96.
219. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973). In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905), for example, the Supreme Court upheld a state program of
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balance the nature of the individual liberty affected against the
importance of the government's interest. In some cases this
balancing includes consideration of whether "less restrictive
means" are available that achieve the government's interest.
The government's purpose must be found to be at least "legitimate," 220 and in the case of "fundamental rights," its purpose
must be "compelling." 221 Since the constitutional rights infringed by the more intrusive therapies are fundamental
rights,222 government imposition of these therapies on nonconsenting offenders should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Although no court has found a governmental purpose sufficiently
compelling to justify the imposition of a treatment found to intrude on fundamental rights,223 it is not inconceivable that imposition of such treatments on prisoners or offenders to
accomplish correctional goals will be upheld.
Legitimate governmental purposes that might be served by
these correctional techniques fall into two categories: police
power purposes-those protecting the public health, safety,
welfare or morals; and the parens patriae purpose-government decisionmaking in the best interest of persons who by
reason of age or disability are incapable of making such decisions for themselves. 224 The government interest in rehabilitating offenders, expressly asserted in the typical statutory
conp'ulsory vaccination to prevent an epidemic over petitioner's free exercise
challenge. The Court nevertheless found that:
The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States ... does
not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good ....
"The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to
such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order
and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
It is...
liberty regulated by law."
rights, is not unrestricted ....
Id. at 26-27 (quoting Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890)) (citations
omitted).
220. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244-49 (1978); J. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONsTrU'rIoNAL LAw 382-83 (1978).
221. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973); J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 220, at 382-83; L. TRmE, supra note 110, at 565.
222. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise of religion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment freedom of thought); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
tel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
223. See Friedman, supra note 72, at 72.
224. See Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally ill, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1222-23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; Friedman, supra note 72, at 72. See also State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va.
417, 426-32, 202 S.E.2d 109, 117-20 (W. Va. 1974).
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delegation of authority to correctional agencies,
tified under either category.

225

might be jus-

The government's parens patriae power, however, is not
persuasive in the rehabilitation context. Although correctional
authorities may attempt to justify rehabilitative programs as
being in the best interest of the offenders involved, our constitutional heritage rebels at governmental paternalism when the
individual is able to decide his or her own best interests. Historically, the parens patriae power was premised on the presumed incapacity of minors and the actual incapacity of the
mentally incompetent to protect or care for themselves.2 26 Because this power is based on the need for the government to
protect the well-being of its citizens when they cannot care for
themselves, it may be legitimately invoked only in the case of
individuals who, because of age or physical or mental disabil227
ity, are incapable of determining their own best interests.
Except for the small minority of offenders who are mentally incompetent, involuntary rehabilitation that invades fundamental
constitutional rights should not be justified solely on the government's assertion of the parens patriae power.
Rehabilitation designed to prevent future criminal conduct,
however, does serve important police power objectives. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's
police power."228 In most contexts, the government's police
power interest has been long considered "compelling." 229 Thus,
this governmental interest in rehabilitation might be considered sufficient to outweigh the offender's constitutional right to
object. In fact, in a number of cases involving prisoners complaining of violations of constitutional rights, the Supreme
Court has required only that prison practices further "an important or substantial governmental interest"-something less
than a "compelling interest. '230 In Pell v. Procunier,231 for example, the Court, citing the "paramount objective" of offender
225. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2) (1976); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 401.2(2) (b) (proposed official draft 1962).
226. See Developments, supra note 224, at 1212.
227. See Winick, supra note 181, at 796-97; Developments, supra note 224, at
1212-16. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Winters v. Miller, 446
F.2d 65, 68-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
228. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).
229. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25-27 (1905).
230. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
231. 417 U.S. 817, 823, 827-28 (1974).
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rehabilitation, employed such a standard to uphold a prison
ban on face-to-face interviews with members of the press that
were asserted to violate the first amendment. "Rehabilitation"
was also considered a "substantial governmental interest" in
Procunierv. Martinez;232 but in Martinez, the Court made clear
that it would look beyond the mere assertion of an interest in
rehabilitation. The state had cited "inmate rehabilitation" as
justification for the censorship of statements in prison mail that
"magnify grievances" or "unduly complain." 233 The Court
found this contention wanting, noting that the state did not
"specify what contribution the suppression of complaints
makes to the rehabilitation of criminals," 23 4 and that "the
weight of professional opinion seems to be that inmate freedom
to correspond with outsiders advances rather than retards the
23 5
goal of rehabilitation."
Nonetheless, the governmental interest in rehabilitation in
furtherance of the police power goal of protecting community
safety can be regarded as a "compelling" interest, and certainly
would meet the "substantial" interest test sometimes employed. 23 6 This alone, however, will not justify the imposition
of nonconsensual treatments that invade fundamental rights.
The proposed treatment must also be scrutinized to determine
whether the treatment in question will actually further the governmental interest in rehabilitation. If the "weight of professional opinion" regards the proposed treatment as ineffective,
for example, the courts may well reject the asserted justification for its imposition.237 More importantly, even if professional opinion regards the proposed treatment as generally
efficacious, the courts may prohibit it if alternative approaches
exist that are capable of achieving the desired result and are
less intrusive with respect to constitutional rights. Stated differently, if alternative means exist which would accomplish the
government's interest in a manner that intrudes less on the
fundamental constitutional right at issue, the government may
not choose the more intrusive means-the "less drastic means"
or "least restrictive alternative" must be chosen.
This doctrine has often been applied in first amendment
232. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
233. Id. at 399.
234. Id. at 416.
235. Id. at 412.
236. See generally Note, Standard of JudicialReview for Conditionsof Pretrial Detention, 63 MIwN. L. REV. 457 (1979).
237. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-14 (1974).
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cases. In Shelton v. Tucker,2 3 8 the Supreme Court struck down
an Arkansas statute that required school teachers to disclose
all of the organizations to which they belonged. The Court
ruled:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed2 in
39
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.

Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein,240 in which a durational residence requirement that interfered with the right to vote and
the right to travel was held unconstitutional, the Court reiterated:
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence requirements further a very substantial state interest .... [I]f there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on
constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of
greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose 'less drastic
means.' 2 4 1

In the context of civil commitment of the mentally ill, the
"least restrictive alternative" doctrine has been applied to require that an individual who meets the statutory standards for
civil commitment nevertheless must not be hospitalized if less
restrictive alternative placements are suitable. 242 Moreover,
courts have recently applied the doctrine to require that, when
mental patients refuse a particular therapy, less intrusive therapies be considered before the more intrusive method is imposed. In Rennie v. Klein,243 for example, the district court
found that a treatment program consisting of lithium plus an
antidepressant drug was less intrusive than the antipsychotic
medication proposed by the hospital. Explicitly recognizing the
applicability of the least restrictive alternative doctrine to the
choice of treatments, 24 4 the court ordered the hospital to give
the patient a fair trial on lithium and the antidepressant drug
before seeking to administer antipsychotic medication. 245 The
238. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
239. Id. at 488.
240. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
241. Id. at 343.
242. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 M1cH.I REv.1107, 1145-54 (1972).
243. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 79-2576, 79-2577
(3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1980). Accord, Rogers v. Okin, 28 Ciui. L RPTM 2397 (1st Cir.

1980).
244.
245.

462 F. Supp. at 1146.
"[A] patient 'may challenge the forced administration of drugs on the
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Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that before the more
intrusive forms of treatments, such as psychosurgery or electroshock therapy, may be used on involuntarily committed
mental patients, the authorizing court must determine the necessity and reasonableness of the proposed treatment in light
24 6
of the availability of less intrusive treatments.
Although the least restrictive alternative principle has been
applied generally in the correctional context, the United States
Supreme Court has been more deferential to the judgments of
prison authorities, particularly when the infringing restriction
247
relates to security needs. For example, in Pell v. Procunier,
the court refused to invalidate a prison ban on face-to-face interviews with members of the press. Stressing the alternative
means of communication that were still available to inmates,
the Court contended that the "internal problems of state prisons involve issues ... peculiarly within state authority and expertise," 2 48 and found that "security considerations are
sufficiently paramount in the administration of the prison to
justify the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates." 249
Nevertheless, the Court warned that "[c]ourts cannot, of
course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate
and protect fundamental liberties. '2 50 Similarly, in Bell v. Wolfish,251 the Court conceded that "[p]rison administrators ...
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." 252 The Bell Court upheld a rule
basis that alternative methods should be tried before a more intrusive technique like psychotropic medication is used."' Id. (quoting Winick, supra note
181, at 813). Accord, In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 753 n.15 (D.C. 1979).
246. Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262-63, 239 N.W.2d 905, 913 (1976).
247. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
248. Id. at 826.
249. Id. at 827.
250. Id. Cf. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119 (1977), in which the court sustained regulations permitting membership in
a prisoner union but prohibited inmate solicitation of other inmates to join the
union, barred union meetings, and banned bulk mailings by the union. The
Court deemed these limitations '"rationaliy related to the reasonable... objectives of prison administration," id. at 129, found first amendment speech rights
to be "barely implicated," id. at 130, and although conceding that first amendment associational rights were "perhaps more directly implicated," id. at 132,
found that they nevertheless must "give way to the reasonable considerations
of penal management." Id.
251. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
252. Id. at 547.
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prohibiting inmate receipt of hardback books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores, because the
rule was a "rational response by prison officials to an obvious
security problem," 2 53 and because alternative means of ob254
taining reading material were readily available.
Even allowing for this deferential posture, prison authorities have been subjected to the least restrictive alternative
principle. In Procunierv. Martinez,255 the Court held that censorship of prison mail may be justified only as follows: "First,
the regulation or practice in question must further ... one or
more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."25 6 Finding the authorized censorship of prisoner
mail "far broader than any legitimate interest of penal adminis257
tration demands," the Court invalidated the restrictions.
The correctional therapies at issue, certain behavioral techniques, and organic treatments, are easily distinguishable from
even the cases in which the courts were most deferential to
prison authorities. Unlike the security regulations in Pell and
Wolfish, which are best characterized as incidental restrictions
on first amendment expression, 258 the more intrusive therapies
result in direct, severe invasions of bodily privacy and impede
the very capacity to generate ideas. 25 9 Unlike the interview and
mail restrictions, there are no alternative means of exercising
the fundamental rights invaded by involuntary imposition of
organic therapy. Moreover, at least some of the organic therapies intrude on mental processes and mental and physical privacy in a way that is permanent and irreversible. The fact of
confinement and the need for prison security and order may
make some first amendment restriction necessary, but these
considerations do not justify the imposition of intrusive ther253. Id. at 550.
254. Id. at 552.
255. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
256. Id. at 413.
257. Id. at 416.
258. See notes 247-54 supra, 412-15 infra and accompanying text.
259. In considering the validity of governmental intrusions on constitutionally protected rights, the Supreme Court has treated the nature and degree of
the intrusion as a relevant factor in determining the appropriate standard of review. See Spece, Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Commitment and
the Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARiz. L. Rav. 1049, 1074 (1979).
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apy. Prison restrictions related to "security considerations...
paramount in the administration of the prison"260 are accordingly entitled to considerably more deference than that owed
the correctional choice of rehabilitative techniques. Rehabilitation is a less important governmental interest than the need to
protect institutional security. Moreover, prison authorities may
be expert in matters of security, but in view of the total absence of consensus as to "what works" in the way of rehabilitation, 261 correctional authorities can make no similar claim for
judicial deference in their choice of rehabilitative means. Particularly in the case of community-based programs, some of
which are not residential, security considerations and the deference they justify would seem minor or even nonexistent.
The least restrictive alternative principle, therefore, should
apply to correctional choices of rehabilitative techniques intruding on fundamental rights, just as it has begun to apply to
the treatment of civilly-committed mental patients. The continuum of coerciveness, although admittedly oversimplified, can
be useful in applying the least restrictive alternative principle.
Thus, an offender should be allowed to contend that verbal
techniques, for example, should be attempted before the government may impose the somewhat more intrusive behavioral
techniques, and that behavioral techniques should be attempted before the imposition of organic therapy. 262 Moreover,
a convicted defendant who prefers incarceration over an alternative sentence that involves one of the more intrusive rehabilitative therapies should be able to argue that the least
restrictive alternative principle amounts to a right to refuse the
proposed therapy. Similarly, this principle should apply to an
incarcerated prisoner who would prefer continued incarceration over participation in a treatment program utilizing the intrusive techniques.
An analysis of the relevant governmental interest supports
the right of an offender who prefers incarceration to refuse certain intrusive treatments. Because the parens patriae interest
applies only when a prisoner is not competent to make decisions concerning his or her own best interests, 2 63 the government's interest with respect to the great bulk of offenders who
260. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
261. See note 2 supra.
262. Should empirical evidence prove that a less intrusive technique is ineffective, however, the technique need not be utilized because it would not be an
alternative that would accomplish the government's interest.
263. See note 227 supra and accompanying text.
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are competent is limited to the police power interest in protection of community safety. This interest in community safety,
although compelling, can be fully achieved through the continued confinement of the offender.264 Thus, an offender who
chooses confinement over intrusive therapy can reasonably argue that confinement simpliciter is a less restrictive means of
achieving the government's interest. Although many offenders
may regard continued confinement as more onerous than participation in an intrusive therapy program, some would no
doubt prefer incarceration. Because incarceration fully
achieves the government's interest in promoting community
safety, such offenders should be entitled to elect incarceration
to preserve the integrity of their mental and physical processes
from serious invasion.
The government might contend that requiring an offender
to participate in certain therapy programs would allow an earlier release date and thus would avoid costly incarceration.
The government's interest in saving money, however, although
certainly legitimate, is not so compelling as to justify the imposition of intrusive treatments that infringe upon fundamental
constitutional rights. When states have sought on financial
grounds to justify one year residence requirements for receipt
of welfare benefits, for example, the Supreme Court has held
that in order to demonstrate a compelling interest, the state
"must do more than show that denying welfare benefits to new
residents saves money." 265 Federal courts have rejected similar contentions when they have been urged to justify prison
266
The
conditions that fail to meet constitutional requirements.
and
mental
to
and
of
mentation
to
freedom
right
fundamental
264. See D. WEXLER, CRIMNAL CoMMIrMENTs AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS: LEGAL ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT AND RELEASE 15-16 (1976);
Friedman, mupra note 72, at 73; Shapiro, supra note 24, at 299-300.
265. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). See also United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977) (rejecting cost-saving as a justification for a state's impairment of its contract obligations to bondholders);
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) (holding that prisoners' right of access
to courts requires prison to provide adequate law libraries or aid from lawtrained persons, the Court noted that "the cost of protecting a constitutional
right cannot justify its total denial"); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204-07
(1977) (administrative economy rejected as a justification for Social Security
Act provision treating widowers differently than widows for purposes of survivor's benefits); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-49 (1972) (less restrictive alternatives required even though more expensive); Spece, supra note 259, at
1055 n.31.
266. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss.
1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
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physical privacy should similarly be found to outweigh the government's financial concerns.
Should the government seek to justify intrusive treatment
of disruptive prisoners as a means of protecting other inmates
from harm, the least drastic alternative principle again applies.
Although "one of the primary goals of prison administration is
physical protection of the inmates," 267 this interest may be accomplished by increasing security precautions, by transferring
disruptive prisoners to more restrictive settings, or by imposing
solitary confinement or physical restraints; all of these meas268
ures are less onerous than the intrusive therapies.
A similar least restrictive alternative argument may be
made by the offender who seeks to resist a therapeutic intervention that falls high enough on the continuum to merit strict
scrutiny and who would prefer some other therapy that is even
more intrusive. Provided the preferred therapy is as effective
in preventing recidivism, the offender should be permitted to
waive his right to resist what would seem the more intrusive
intervention. Thus, for example, should a sex offender find castration preferable to aversive conditioning or medication (assuming all three were effective in preventing future sex
offenses), he should, if willing to accept castration, be able to
resist what most of us would consider the more preferable behavioral or pharmacological option.
In summary, the governmental interests in rehabilitation
and in protecting other inmates from harm seem sufficient to
justify involuntary imposition of all verbal techniques and at
least some of the behavioral techniques; these methods do not,
under the previous analysis, invade fundamental constitutional
rights. Offenders should be able to assert a constitutional right
to refuse the more intrusive therapeutic interventions, however, by arguing that less intrusive techniques must first be attempted, and ultimately, that the right to choose incarceration
or restrictive confinement over the imposed therapy is absolute. Such confinement fully serves the police power interest in
267. Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 249 (1979). Indeed, the failure of prison officials to protect a prisoner from attack by other
prisoners may violate the eighth amendment, see Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193,
197 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978); Parker v. McKeithen, 488
F.2d 553, 555-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973), and the fourteenth amendment. See
Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d at 555; Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 518 (3rd
Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. nom. Smith v. Curtis, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
268. See Sitnick, supra note 182, at 394.
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rehabilitation-it protects the safety of the community and
other inmates.
IV.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENTTHE REQUIREMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT
FOR OFFENDERS

Although offenders may possess a constitutional right to refuse correctional programs employing intrusive techniques,
they might desire to waive this right. Criminal defendants who
enter guilty pleas, for example, waive fundamental rights under
the fifth and sixth amendments, including the rights to effective
assistance of counsel, to trial by jury, to confrontation of adverse witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination. 269 In upholding the constitutionality of plea bargaining, the Supreme Court
specified the elements of an effective waiver. "Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 270 This formulation is consonant with the Court's traditional waiver standard that requires the government to prove the existence of
"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." 27 1 Essentially the same waiver standard has
272
been applied by the Court in noncriminal contexts.
269. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).
270. 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
271. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (cited in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n.6 (1970)). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
475-76 (1966). The Court has applied a somewhat more relaxed waiver standard
in the case of criminal defendants consenting to warrantless searches which
would otherwise violate the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches
and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In these cases the Court
stressed the voluntariness aspect of waiver, rejecting the argument that consent was invalid absent a showing by the government that the consenting party
understood that it could be freely withheld. See 412 U.S. at 227. The Court
nonetheless reaffirmed that "consent [may] not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force." Id. at 228. The question
whether consent is voluntary or the product of duress or coercion is treated by
the Court as "a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Id. at 227. Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is treated
merely as "one factor to be taken into account." Id. In considering the totality
of the circumstances, the prosecutor has the burden of proving that consent
"was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given," a burden that "cannot be discharged
by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968). For analyses of waiver in criminal
cases, see Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysas, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977); Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional
Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv. L REV. 1 (1970).
272. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (standard for waiver of
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These elements of constitutional waiver closely parallel the
elements of the informed consent doctrine. 273 For example, in
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health,2 74 the
court held that, "[t] o be legally adequate, a subject's informed
27 5
Simiconsent must be competent, knowing and voluntary."
larly, HEW regulations on the protection of human subjects define informed consent as "the knowing consent of an individual
or his legally authorized representative, so situated as to be
able to exercise free power of choice without undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other
form of constraint or coercion." 27 6 Thus, if the decision process
is sufficiently free of coercion and undue influence, an offender
who receives sufficient information concerning the possible
risks of a proposed therapy and alternative therapies, and who
possesses sufficient competence and intelligence to comprehend the information, may make a voluntary choice to participate in the proposed therapy.
Specific elements of the informed consent requirements
may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending upon differing statutory, regulatory, and case law approaches, but these
basic principles are common to most formulations. 277 Given
the choice to participate in therapies that they have a constitutional right to refuse, most prisoners would be able to meet the
requirements for informed consent and thereby waive their
constitutional rights. In principle, for example, the elements of
notice in conditional sales contracts); D. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174
(1972) (upholding the validity of cognovit note).
273. See generally J. KATZ, supra note 55, at 521-88; D. LOUISELL & H. WILimsS, supra note 69,
22.01-.08; LEGISLATIVE AND SOCIAL ISSUES COMM. OF THE
AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CONSENT HANDBOOK (1977); Levine, The Nature and Definition ofInformed Consent in Various Research Settings, in THE
BELMONT REPORT- ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 3-1 (National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical Research 1978) [hereinafter cited as THE BELMONT REPORT]; Meisel, Roth & Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 285 (1977); Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Tests of
Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 279 (1977); Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1970).
274. No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 63. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying
text.
275. Slip op. at 22, A. BROOKS, supra note 63, at 912. In The Belmont Report,
the National Commission noted that "there is widespread agreement that the
consent process can be analyzed as containing three elements: information,
comprehension, and voluntariness." THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 273, at
10.
276. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(c) (1979).
277. See note 272 supra.

1981]

CORRECTIONAL THERAPY

comprehension and information could be easily met in most

Situations.278
The requirement of voluntariness, however, is more troubling in the correctional context. In its Report on Research Involving Prisoners, the National Commission considered
"whether prisoners are, in the words of the Nuremberg Code,
'so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice'-that

is, whether prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to par-

ticipate in research." 279 Some of the commissioners argued
that prisons, by their very purpose and character, make sufmiciently free consent to research impossible.280 Similarly, several participants at the National Minority Conference on
Human Experimentation objected in principle to the notion of
truly voluntary consent by prisoners. 28 ' The Commission, however, ultimately rejected the idea that prisons are so inherently
coercive that voluntary consent is impossible, and concluded
that at least some prison research could be undertaken with
appropriate safeguards. 282 The Commission proposed a
number of requirements to ensure "a high degree of voluntariness on the part of the prospective participants," including "adequate living conditions, provisions for effective redress of
grievances, separation of research participation from parole
considerations, and public scrutiny."283 HEW regulations eventually adopted as a result of the Commission's work include an
additional protection for prisoners subjected to biomedical and

278. Of course, full disclosure of the relevant information to an offender
possessing the ability to comprehend does not ensure that the consent obtained is in fact a knowledgeable one. Informed consent procedures typically
stress the disclosure of information. Whether this information has been effectively communicated to patients or subjects is rarely studied. Several studies
indicate that even where the requisite information is disclosed, subjects rarely
understand the risks and available alternatives and do not feel free to refuse
participation. See, e.g., Halleck, supra note 10, at 29-30; McCollum & Schwartz,
PediatricResearch Hospitalization: Its Meaning to Parents, 3 PEDIATRIC RES.
199, 199 (1969). For discussion of this problem and proposals for reform, see
generally Treat, Proposed Changes for Obtaining Consentfrom Experimental
Subjects, 1 L. & HuMAN BEHAVIOR 43 (1977).
279. PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 5.
280. Branson, supra note 54, at 17 (remarks of Commissioner King).
281. PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 42,44. The Conference was held
under the auspices of the National Commission. This was also the view of the
American Correctional Association. American Correctional Ass'n, Position
Statement: The Use of Prisonersand Detainees as Subjects of Human Experimentation, Feb. 20, 1976, in PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 22-1 to 22-2
app.

282. Palmer, Biomedical and Behavioral Research on Prisoners:Public Policy Issues in Human Experimentation, in PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18,
at 14-21 app.; see Branson, supra note 54, at 16.
283. PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18, at 16.
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behavioral research: "[A] dequate assurance exists that parole
boards will not take into account a prisoner's participation in
the research in making decisions regarding parole, and each
prisoner is clearly informed in advance that participation in the
research will have no effect on his or her parole ... "284
In the Kaimowitz case 285 the court considered the impact
of institutionalization generally and of the inducement when
release is tied to consent, holding that involuntarily confined
mental patients are unable as a matter of law to consent to experimental psychosurgery:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient may have sufficient I.Q. to intellectually comprehend his circumstances .... the
very nature of his incarceration diminishes the capacity to consent to
psychosurgery.
...The fact of institutional confinement has special force in undermining the capacity of the mental patient to make a competent decision on this issue, even though he be intellectually competent to do so.
... It is impossible for an involuntarily detained mental patient to
be free of ulterior forms of restraint or coercion when his very release
from the institution may depend upon his cooperating with institutional authorities and giving consent to experimental surgery.

Involuntarily confined mental patients live in an inherently coercive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological coercion has a profound effect upon the patient population .... They are
not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the inherent
2 86
inequality of their position.

The court's rationale seems equally applicable to prisoners,
whose institutional environment is marked by the same subtle
and not so subtle psychological coercion. Similarly, the prisoner who consents in the hope of obtaining parole, or the offender who agrees to community treatment to avoid
incarceration, seem indistinguishable from the involuntarily
confined patient in Kaimowitz who consented to psychosurgery in the hope of obtaining a release from confinement. It is
doubtful, however, that the sweeping approach of Kaimowitz
will be followed by other courts. In fact, the Kaimowitz court
sought to limit its holding to the experimental psychosurgery
that was proposed by stating that consent could be given to
conventionally accepted procedures. 287 Notwithstanding this
284. 45 C.F.R. § 46.305(a)(6) (1979).
285. Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW
(Wayne County [Mich.] Cir. Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in A. BRooxs, supra
note 63.
286. Id., slip op. at 25-29, A. BRooKs at 913-15.
287. Id. at 40, A. BRooKs at 920.
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disclaimer, some commentators have suggested that the court's
reasoning should be applied to all treatment procedures,

whether experimental or not.288
Although the Kaimowitz court may have reached the right
result on the facts of that case, 2 8 9 the potential breadth of the
court's holding concerning the effects of institutionalization and
the promise of release on the capacity to give informed consent
could give rise to absurd and constitutionally dubious results.
Institutionalization may substantially diminish the ability of
some prisoners to decide freely on therapy, and the lure of release or of avoiding incarceration may be so potent that, for at
least some offenders, refusal to consent is virtually impossible.
These factors, however, should not preclude all offenders from
being considered capable of making these decisions voluntarily.
If institutionalization per se so diminishes decisionmaking abilities that prisoners are incompetent to elect psychosurgery,
how can prisoners be considered competent to make other important decisions? Can they decide to have elective surgery or
other medical treatment when needed, to choose particular
work assignments that may be more hazardous than others, or
to agree to accept certain conditions of parole? Moreover, if the
prospect of release renders confined individuals incompetent to
elect psychosurgery, how can prisoners be permitted to elect
the variety of other prison programs that are likely to result in
early release?
The absurdity of a per se rule based upon the impact of institutionalization or the lure of release arises from its sweeping
effect. A common example of use of the early release lure to
modify prisoner behavior is the virtually universal practice of
providing "good time" credit. As the Supreme Court noted in
McGinnis v. Royster,2 90 "the granting of good-time credit toward parole eligibility takes into account a prisoner's rehabilitative performance." 29' The New York Statute involved in
Royster authorized such good time credit "for good conduct
2 92
and efficient and willing performance of duties assigned."
Under a new rule recently adopted by the United States Bu288. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT, PRISoNERS' RiGrrs 1979, 417-26, 612 (1979).

289. See generally Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisonersfrom the Doctors, 5
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25 (Jan. 1975).
290. 410 U.S. 263 (1973).
291. Id. at 271.
292. Id. at 266-67 n.5 (quoting Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973, 974-75

(S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
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reau of Prisons, an award of "extra good time" may be made
for, among other things, "[v] oluntary acceptance and satisfactory performance of an unusually hazardous assignment." 2 93
Yet if the Kaimowitz approach is broadly construed, the decision of prisoners to accept such assignments or participate in
such programs could be considered involuntary as a matter of
law.
The approach in Kaimowitz also seems unduly paternalistic. Offenders who genuinely desire to participate in a therapy
program could be deemed legally unable to do so. Yet to deny
access to a particular therapeutic program that an offender
"voluntarily" and competently elects may, in effect, impose additional confinement, and may even violate the offender's constitutional right of privacy. 294 For these and other reasons,
broad application of the Kaimowitz doctrine has been roundly
criticized by commentators and at least implicitly rejected in a
295
number of subsequent cases.
In an analogous situation, plea bargaining, the courts have
rejected the notion that the opportunity or even the assurance
293. 28 C.F.R. § 523.16(a) (2) (1979). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 55,004 (1979) (to be
codified in 28 C.F.R. § 2.60) (rule of United States Parole Commission permitting advancement of presumptive release date for "superior program achievement" in "educational, vocational, industry, or counselling programs").
294. In certain circumstances the right of privacy protects health decisions
made between individuals and their physicians from governmental interference. See Aden v. Younger, 257 Cal. App. 3d 662, 679-82, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546-48
(1976); Wexler, supra note 210, at 681-84. But see Rutherford v. United States,
399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th
Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), rev'd, 616 F.2d 455 (10th
Cir. 1980).
295. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUmAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, PSYCHOSURGERY 19, 22 (1977); R.
ScHwrrZGEBEL, supra note 151, at 56-57; Murphy, Total Institutionsand the Possibility of Consent to Organic Therapies, 5 HuMAN RIGHTS 25, 25-28 (1975);
Singer, Consent of the Unfree, Part //, 1 L, & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 101, 148-61
(1977); Wexler, supra note 210, at 677-84. See also N. MoRms, supra note 1, at
24-26. Professor Singer, in the most extensive discussion of these issues, concludes that "the confined, assuming competency, can indeed consent to any
and all kinds of experimentation or behavior change, including psychosurgery."
Singer, supra, at 101. With the exception of cases in which the offender, as a
means of inducing his consent, has been charged with an offense in excess of
that which the facts of his alleged crime would warrant, and with the further
exception of prison systems in which the conditions of confinement are not
minimally acceptable or in which the release system is inequitable, Singer concludes that "participation motivated by early release . .. would be both morally and legally viable." Id. at 162. He finds the argument that
institutionalization per se should invalidate consent to be without factual evidence to sustain it. Id. Moreover, he expresses concern that acceptance of the
argument might lead to unwarranted intrusions upon other rights of prisoners.
Id.
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of a shorter sentence necessarily renders a guilty plea involuntary. In Brady v. United States,296 the defendant had attacked
the validity of his guilty plea, arguing that it was entered to
avoid the possibility of the death penalty. Under the statute involved, the death penalty could be imposed following a jury determination of guilt but could not be imposed when a
defendant waived trial and pled guilty. Stressing that "[t]he
voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it,"297
the Court rejected the coercion claim:
Even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty except for
the death penalty provision ....
this assumption merely identifies the
penalty provision as a "but for" cause of his plea. That the statute
caused the plea in this sense does not necessarily prove that the plea
was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act....
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual
or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will
of the defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this case....
Brady's claim is of a different sort: that it violates the Fifth Amendment to influence or encourage a guilty plea by opportunity or promise
of leniency and that a guilty plea is coerced and invalid if influenced by
the fear of a possibly higher penalty for the crime charged if a conviction is obtained after the State is put to its proof.
... We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled
and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the
defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty...

298

The Brady court adopted as its standard of voluntariness the
rule that a guilty plea "must stand unless induced by threats
, or perhaps by promises that are
...
, misrepresentation...
by their nature improper," such as bribes.299 Under this standard, the Court held that "a plea of guilty is not invalid merely
because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty."30 0
If avoidance of the possibility of a death sentence is not so
inherently coercive as to invalidate a guilty plea, then it is difficult to see how the possibility or promise of early release could
be considered so inherently coercive as to invalidate an offender's choice of therapy. Of course, there may be cases in
which the forces of institutionalization render a particular prisoner incapable of making such voluntary choices or in which
threats or promises are so potent that the particular offender's
296. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
297. Id. at 749.
298. Id. at 750-51.
299. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1957)).
300. 397 U.S. at 755.
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consent is virtually assured. Nevertheless, this does not mean
that institutionalization or the opportunity of early release or of
avoidance of confinement renders consent impossible.
Virtually no choice is totally free of coercion. 301 Psychologist Israel Goldiamond has performed a useful behavioral analysis of voluntariness and coercion, defining situations of
coercion and noncoercion through the use of a contingency
analysis. 3 02 In this model, coercion is most severe when there
are no genuine choices and the consequences contingent on behavior are critical. 303 Certainly plea bargaining is coercive in
this model,3 0 4 sometimes extremely so. Nevertheless, courts
have accepted the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining, deeming
305
this degree of coercion constitutionally tolerable.
One court has even held that informed consent may be
valid where the conditions of confinement thereby avoided are
themselves unconstitutional. In Bailey v. Lally,30 6 inmates at
the Maryland House of Corrections challenged the constitutionality of a state-sponsored program of medical experimentation
in which they had participated. General conditions at the
prison were concededly bad; in fact, similar conditions had
been declared unconstitutional in prior cases. The medical research program in question offered at least a partial escape
from those conditions into a live-in medical unit that provided a
clean, less restrictive environment with air conditioning, adequate heating, hot water, color television, and separate bathroom facilities. Volunteers had the opportunity to earn extra
money, and could hope that parole authorities would take their
participation into consideration, although the inmates were not
301. See Goldiamond, Protection of Human Subjects and Patients: A Social
Contingency Analysis of DistinctionsBetween Research and Practice, and its
Implications, 4 BEHAVIORISM 1, 27 (1976) ("coercion is not absolute; there are
degrees of coercion as well as of freedom"); Jaffee, supra note 70, at 216. For an
extensive philosophical analysis of the concept of coercion, see Coercion [1972]
YEARBOOK OF THE Am. SOC'Y FOR PoLrIcAL & LEGAL PHnosoPHY 1-328 (J.Pen-

nock & J. Chapman eds. 1972).
302. Goldiamond, supra note 301, at 20-34; Goldiamond, Singling Out Behavior Modificationsfor Legal Regulation: Some Effects on Patient Care, Psychotherapy and Research in General, 17 Amiz. L. REv. 105, 121-25 (1975).
303. Goldiamond, supra note 301, at 23.
304. See Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CH. L REv. 3, 12-13
(1978); Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MwNN. L REv. 669, 675-78 (1980).
305. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222-23 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
(1977). The Supreme Court has even suggested that plea bargaining, properly
conducted, is worthy of encouragement. See Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 260 (1971).
306. 481 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1979).
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advised that their participation would affect parole. Nevertheless, the district court held that this was not legally impermissible coercion. While acknowledging that the prison conditions
may have made participation "very attractive," the court noted
307
that many inmates declined to participate in the program.
Moreover, prisoners who did participate were not directly pressured to do so and were not subjected to the unconstitutional
conditions as a means of inducing their consent. Rather, the
as
court found that the prisoners "had a viable choice" as well 30
8
"the option to withdraw" from the experimental program.
Approving the procedures used for obtaining informed consent,
the court noted that the doctors involved made "diligent, continuing efforts" to inform the subjects concerning the various
studies. 3 0 9 By providing information orally rather than merely
relying on a written consent form, and by emphasizing the right
of subjects to withdraw from the program at any time, the doctors "took the necessary measures to assure that the prisoners
were exercising their free choice." 3 10 The court thus declined
to deem the prisoners' consent involuntary.
In Knecht v. Gillman,311 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found that the involuntary use of apomorphine
in a behavior modification program constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court indicated, however, that use of this
technique on inmates "who knowingly and intelligently consent" 312 would be permitted if an adequate system was instituted that would assure that informed consent was obtained.
The inmates affected in Knecht were certainly subject to the inherent coercion of institutionalization and to the inducement of
potentially early release if they participated; yet the court considered them legally capable to give consent.
These cases suggest that most offenders will be deemed, in
principle, capable of consenting to even the most intrusive of
treatment programs-programs that they otherwise appear to
have a constitutional right to refuse. Because the inherent psychological pressures faced by offenders choosing rehabilitative
alternatives are simply not avoidable, courts seek only to pro307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 220.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 220.
488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1138.
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tect against additional or related pressures that are unfair. 13
An analogy to plea bargaining is useful. The inherent coerciveness of plea bargaining is mitigated by the presence and advice
of counsel during the plea bargaining process, 314 and by the
practice of giving pleas in open court where the judge is required to conduct a review of the extent of the defendant's
knowledge of his or her rights and the voluntariness of their
waiver. 315 Similar protections could easily be fashioned in the
context of consent to the most intrusive of treatments. Indeed,
some type of pretreatment hearing and independent review
16
may be required by the guarantee of procedural due process.
With these procedural qualifications, it seems likely that courts
would uphold the validity of consent given by offenders in connection with correctional therapies.
V.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND
CORRECTIONAL THERAPIES

If a particular therapy is deemed so intrusive upon fundamental interests that prisoners have a constitutional right to refuse it, procedural due process issues will not arise-the
potential subject has, by definition, an absolute veto power over
whether to participate. Procedural due process guarantees
may, however, affect the adequacy of informed consent practices and the validity of involuntarily administered therapies
that are somewhat intrusive but that offenders have no right to
refuse.
A.

LIBERTY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS

Procedural due process guarantees derive from the fifth
and fourteenth amendments, which together prohibit the federal and state governments from depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. Not every
grievous loss inflicted upon a person by the government is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections; 317 the threshold in313. Murphy, supra note 295, at 38; Wexler, Reflections on the Regulation of
Behavior Modification in InstitutionalSettings, 17 Amiz. I- REV. 132, 133 (1975).
314.. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970). Compare Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973) and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1970) with Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215 (1973).
315. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 241-44 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969);
FED. R. CRnm. P. 11.
316. See notes 356-74 infra and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (transfer from me-
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quiry is whether the interest infringed upon may be classified
as a "liberty" or "property" interest. 18
"Liberty" within the meaning of the due process clause
"denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual... generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."3 19 Even if not expressly protected by the
constitution, liberty interests may arise from state law, such as
when a state affords prisoners a statutory right to good time
320
credit that may be forfeited only for serious misbehavior.
"Property" interests, for due process purposes, typically are not
created by the constitution, but rather arise from an independent source such as state law. 321 Thus, tangible and intangible
interests, as well as legitimate claims of entitlement to a benefit
or status protected by state law for those meeting or maintaining specified qualifications, have been considered protected by
due process. 322 When a government action is found to deprive
a person of either a liberty or property interest, courts usually
require that notice and some kind of hearing be provided prior
3
to interference with the protected interest. 2
Although procedural due process protections do apply to
prisoners, 324 the Supreme Court has recognized that a valid
dium security to maximum security prison with less desirable living conditions
does not infringe a liberty interest within due process clause).
318. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
319. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Meyer definition of
"liberty" has been cited frequently. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
673 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). The Court has indicated that "[fin a constitution for free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
at 572.
320. For example, a prisoner may acquire a liberty interest under a statute
that guarantees time off for good behavior. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 410 U.S.
539, 557-58 (1974). Accord, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91 (1980) (state law
afforded prisoner liberty interest in avoiding transfer to mental hospital absent
fulfillment of specified standards); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82
(1972) (state law granted prisoner conditional liberty interest in parole);
Enomoto v. Wright, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402-03 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (state law granted
prisoner liberty interest when transferred to solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons), af'd, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
321. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See generally
Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L REv. 269, 275-83 (1975); Note,
Statutory Entitlement and the Concept of Property, 86 YALE L.J. 695 (1977);
Comment, Entitlemen Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DuKE I.J. 89.
322. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (public school attendance); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (welfare benefits).
323. See generally L. TamE, supra note 110, at 501-63.
324. See generally Hughes v. Rowe, 49 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S. Nov. 15, 1980)
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conviction extinguishes many of the liberties otherwise protected by the Constitution. In Meachum v. Fano,325 for example, the Supreme Court held that no notice or hearing was
required upon the discretionary transfer of state prisoners to a
less agreeable prison, even though the transfer resulted in a
substantially adverse change in prison conditions. Finding that
state law conferred no right to be placed in any particular
prison or to remain in a prison to which the prisoner was initially assigned, the Court held that "conviction had sufficiently
extinguished the defendant's liberty interest to empower the
State to confine him in any of its prisons .... Confinement in
any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or
range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State
'326
to impose.
Meachum has been distinguished, however, where the
transfer is not to another prison, but to a state mental hospital.
In Vitek v. Jones,327 the Court found a liberty interest grounded
in an "objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official Penal Complex practice," that such a transfer would not occur unless the prisoner suffered from a mental disease or
defect that could not be adequately treated in the prison.328
Moreover, the Court found that even absent a liberty interest
created by state law, the proposed transfer infringed upon a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in view of the stigma
accompanying placement in a mental hospital and the requirement that prisoners participate in behavior modification pro(prior hearing required for segregation of prisoner absent emergency conditions); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (hearing required prior to transfer of a
prisoner to a mental hospital); Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978) (hearing
required prior to imposition of solitary confinement); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (hearing required prior to forfeiture of accumulated good-time
credit as sanction in prison disciplinary proceedings).
325. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). The Court reached the same result in the companion case of Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), involving a prison transfer
for disciplinary purposes.
326. 427 U.S. at 224-25. The Court applied the same approach in Greenholtz
v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), when it
held that, absent state law giving rise to a legitimate expectancy of release on
parole, the decision of a parole board did not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The Court could find "no constitutional or inherent right
of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a
valid sentence." Id. at 7. "[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant
has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." Id. (quoting Meachurn v.
Fano, 427 U.S. at 224).
327. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
328. Id. at 489 (quoting Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 572-73 (D. Neb.
1977)).
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grams. 329 Finding these consequences "qualitatively different
from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person
convicted of crime,"3 30 the Court noted that although conviction
and sentence extinquish the prisoner's right to freedom from
confinement for the term of the sentence, "they do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him
without affording him adto involuntary psychiatric treatment
33
ditional due process protection. 1
Thus, at least when state law does not give rise to a property or liberty interest in resisting treatment, the question of
whether due process applies to coercive rehabilitation will turn
on whether the treatment infringes a liberty interest protected
by the Constitution, and whether it "is within the normal limits
or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the
State to impose. '332 Prior Supreme Court decisions indicate
that mental hospitalization exceeds these limits, but transfer to
another correctional facility does not. 33 3 The "normal range of

custody" approach suggests that the imposition of traditional
correctional treatments, either within or outside the prison (so
long as they are not at mental hospitals or similarly stigmatizing facilities), will not be found to invade a constitutionally
protected liberty interest. Counseling therapy as well as vocational, educational, and other verbal programs in which offenders may be ordered to participate, are not, standing alone,
seriously stigmatizing. Moreover, these programs would seem
to be "within the normal limits or range of custody which the
334
conviction has authorized the State to impose."
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently implied as much when
it refused to require due process hearings before the issuance
of a parole violator warrant, even though such a warrant could
adversely affect a prisoner's classification and eligibility for institutional programs. 335 Reiterating that due process did not
apply to prison transfers, the Court noted: "The same is true of
prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs
in the federal system. Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control these conditions of confinement,
18 U.S.C. § 4081, and petitioner has no legitimate statutory or
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 491-94.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 324-26 supra.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
Moody v. Dagget, 429 U.S. 78, 85-89 (1976).
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constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process." 336
The statutory scheme cited by the Court has been held to authorize the Attorney General to "establish and conduct all industries and other activities, classify the inmates, and provide
for their proper government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation and reformation."3 3 7 A similar provision authorizes
the United States Parole Commission to impose as a condition
of parole that "a parolee ... reside in or participate in the program of a residential community treatment center, or both."338
On the federal level, these statutes would certainly seem to define the "normal limits or range of custody" to which convicted
defendants may be subjected without additional due process
protections. Similarly, when state law contemplates rehabilitation as a goal of incarceration or alternative sentence, or provides that community treatment may be made a condition of
parole, imposition of traditional correctional therapies that are
not themselves seriously stigmatizing will probably be deemed
within the normal range of custody and hence, beyond the
reach of the due process clause.
The Supreme Court is generally disinclined to impose due
process requirements on state correctional decisionmaking. In
refusing to require a hearing for all parole release decisions, for
example, the Court noted the similarities among parole release,
probation release, and correctional rehabilitation. In each area,
"few certainties exist" and in each
the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decision-making in that the choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal
observation filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and
leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for the individ339
ual inmate and for the community.

In language that seems equally applicable to traditional verbal
rehabilitative approaches, the Court emphasized the discretionary and subjective judgments involved in parole release:
[T] here is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable
to the individual. The parole determination, like a prisoner-transfer decision, may be made "for a variety of reasons and often involve [s] no
more than informed predictions as to what would best serve [correctional purposes] or the safety and welfare of the inmate."3 0

Stating that the function of due process is largely "to minimize
336. Id. at 88 n.9.
337. Thogmartin v. Moseley, 313 F. Supp. 158, 159 (D. Kan. 1969), affid, 430
F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970).
338. 18 U.S.C. § 4209(c)(1) (1976).
339. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 8 (1980).
340. Id. at 10 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)).
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the risk of erroneous decisions," 341 the Court found this concern inapplicable to the essentially subjective and predictive
decisions made by parole boards. Recognizing the experimental character of parole release decisionmaking, the Court
praised such experimentation, which it feared might be abandoned or curtailed "[i] f parole determinations are encumbered
by procedures that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted."34 2
The Court's reluctance to burden rehabilitation with formal
proceedings will likely be overcome, however, when techniques
more intrusive than the verbal approaches are imposed. Both
the organic approach and many of the behavioral approaches
do not seem "within the normal limits or range of custody
34 3
which the conviction has authorized the State to impose."
344
the Supreme Court mentioned
Indeed, in Vitek v. Jones,
"mandatory behavior modification programs" and "involuntary
psychiatric treatment" as factors bearing on its finding that
transfer to a mental hospital invades constitutionally protected
liberty. 345 This strongly suggests that imposition of the more
intrusive techniques, even in nonhospital settings, would be
held to infringe protected liberty interests.
In Vitek, the Court also relied in part on Ingraham v.
Wright,34 6 which had recognized that protected liberties include "a right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief for,
unjustified intrusions on personal security."347 In Ingraham,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of corporal
punishment for public school students, but nonetheless found
that such punishment invades a liberty interest protected by
the Constitution and therefore was within the cognizance of
due process. Although conceding "a de minimis level of impo341. 442 U.S. at 13.
342. Id.
343. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
344. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
345. Id. at 492.
346. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
347. Id. at 673. A recent district court opinion found that perhaps the oldest
liberty recognized by the common law is "a person's right to be free from unwanted personal contact." Davis v. Hubbard, No. C73-205 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16,
1980), summarized at 49 U.S.L.W. 2215 (1980). The court traced this "interest in.
the physical security of one's body" to the Magna Carta, and cited Blackstone's
identification of "the right of personal security" as one of the 'three elements
of 'liberty' guaranteed to all Englishmen." Id. See also Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property",62 CoINELL L. Rav. 405, 433 (1977) (interference with an individual's bodily integrity, as well as with his "psychic integrity-his personality," implicates constitutional liberty).
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sition with which the Constitution is not concerned," the Ingraham Court held that when school authorities restrain a student
and inflict "appreciable physical pain," fourteenth amendment
liberty interests are implicated. 34 8 Similarly, correctional therapies that involve "intrusions on personal security" of more than
a de minimis nature would seem subject to the requirements of
due process. 34 9 The organic techniques, which by definition involve bodily intrusions, and aversive conditioning techniques
that involve physically intrusive stimuli or severe deprivations,
certainly are more than de minimis.3 5 0 Imposition of these
more intrusive therapies may also stigmatize their offender-recipients, 35' resulting in adverse social consequences such as
those found to accompany mental hospitalization in Vitek.352
Moreover, protected liberty interests have traditionally been
defined to include a person's "right to be free in the enjoyment
of all his faculties." ' 35 3 Accordingly, to the extent that intrusive
therapies interfere with mental integrity in a way incapable of
being resisted, these therapies may invade constitutional liberty even if they do not involve bodily intrusions.
For all of these reasons, the more intrusive therapies
clearly appear to infringe that "residuum of liberty" retained
by offenders, 354 and may be imposed, if at all, only after affording additional due process protection to those affected. 355
348. 430 U.S. at 674.
349. The Supreme Court's sanctioning of visual body cavity searches of pretrial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979), does not conflict
with this analysis. Not only did Wolsh involve a fourth amendment search
and seizure question rather than a fifth or fourteenth amendment due process
issue, but the intrusions involved were visual inspections only, rather than invasions of physical security.
350. See notes 347-48 supra and accompanying text.
351. See HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL LABORATORY OF COmMuNITY PsycHIATRY, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS 63 (1973); Winick,

supra note 181, at 807. See generally Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Scientists: The
Perilsof the "Criminal-Insane,"123 U. PA. L. REV. 258 (1974).
352. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In a number of prior cases involving government
action imposing a stigma accompanied by denial of some more tangible interest
such as employment or educational opportunities, the Court has found that
procedural due process requires a hearing. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 574 (1975) and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) with Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 348 (1976) and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-10 (1976).
353. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
354. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980).
355. See also Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (due
process hearing required before transfer to prison tier program involving severe deprivations); Harmon v. McNutt, 91 Wash. 2d 126, 587 P.2d 537 (1978) (due
process hearing required for prisoners prior to transfer to mental health unit
and use of dramatic or intrusive treatment). Cf. Rogers v. Okin, 28 Cium. L
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THE NATURE OF THE HEARING REQUIRED

When liberty or property interests are found implicated by
a proposed therapy program, some form of hearing will be re-

quired, but it might not follow the formal, adversarial judicial
model for fact finding.

356

'The very nature of due process ne-

gates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applica357
due process instead "is
ble to every imaginable situation;"
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."

358

In determining what process is due

in a particular situation, the Supreme Court has engaged in a
broad balancing approach, considering three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would en359
tail.

In balancing these factors, the Court has displayed an increased willingness to permit informal procedures that depart
substantially from the trial-type hearing traditionally associated with due process. 360 The degree of procedural formality
RPTR. 2397 (1st Cir. 1980) (procedural due process implicated by involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to state mental hospital patients);
Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976) some); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971) (same); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp.
1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (same), appealdocketed, Nos. 79-2576, 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 30,
1980); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 83 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (same).
356. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-13 (1979).
357. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
358. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
359. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Accord, Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584, 604-08 (1979); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977). See
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor AdministrativeAdjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44
U. Cm. L. REv. 28, 30 (1976).
360. See L. TRmE, supra note 110, at 539-54, Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures,43 U. Cm. L REv. 739, 739-42 (1976). Illustrative are four
recent Supreme Court cases. In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the Court,
holding that a student's ten-day suspension from public school without a hearing violated due process, indicated that an informal hearing would be sufficient.
Id. at 574-84. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), because of the existence of a tort remedy under state law for excessive corporal punishment, the
Court refused to impose any hearing requirement in excess of the existing
process, which required a decision to be made by teacher and principal as to
whether corporal punishment was reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Id. at 672-82. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the
Court found that dismissals for academic cause do not necessitate a hearing
before the school's decisionmaking body. Id. at 84-91. In Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584 (1979), the Court considered whether due process required an adver-
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will depend upon the Court's assessment of the risk and cost of
error and the extent to which various procedural safeguards
would minimize the risk, and the costs of such procedures. The
broad range of rehabilitation techniques in use present differing intrusions on constitutional liberties as well as differing
risks of erroneous deprivations, such that the balance may be
struck differently for particular techniques. The proposed continuum of intrusiveness can be used to analyze how the balance will be determined in each case.
In view of the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend due
process protections in a manner that would "subject to judicial
review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather
than of the federal courts," 361 it is likely that courts will find
that informal and flexible procedures, rather than adversarial
trial-like hearings, are generally sufficient for the less intrusive
therapies. 362 This is particularly true in view of the predictive,
subjective, and clinical nature of the judgments involved in assigning offenders to these therapeutic programs. 36 3
The more controversial and intrusive the technique, however, the more likely that courts will insist on more formal, adversarial procedures. More intrusive therapies impose
increasingly greater deprivations on the individuals affected,
thus increasing the risk of harm from erroneous deprivations.
In view of the grave intrusions on fundamental rights
presented by psychosurgery, for example, and the irreversible
nature of the procedure, it is likely that courts will insist upon
a highly formal evidentiary hearing, perhaps by a court, in order to authorize involuntary psychosurgery-assuming a prisoner in a particular context does not have an absolute right to
refuse the treatment.36 For interventions like psychotropic
sary hearing when a parent or guardian seeks to commit a minor child to a
state mental hospital. Finding the child to have "a substantial liberty interest
in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment," id. at 600, the Court
nevertheless found sufficient the statutory procedure under which a hospital
admitting physician was required to review the child's condition to determine
whether the statutory requirements for hospitalization were satisfied. Id. at
616-17.
361. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
362. Cf. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1307-10 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal
docketed, Nos. 79-2576, 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1980) (mandating informal review by an independent psychiatrist before state mental hospital may forcibly
administer psychotropic drugs to involuntarily comitted patients).
363. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979).
364. See, e.g., Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 257, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910
(1976).
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drugs, which may invade fundamental constitutional rights but
usually lack permanent effect, a less formal procedure may be
36 5
required than that required for imposing psychosurgery.
The balance struck for most behavioral techniques will likely
require even less in the way of formality.
366
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Vitek v. Jones,
reveals some procedural safeguards that might be followed for
moderately to highly intrusive programs. In Vitek, the Court
upheld a district court decision which required that, before a
prisoner could be sent to a mental hospital, written notice that
such a transfer was being considered must be provided and an
administrative hearing before an independent decisionmaker
must be held.367 A sufficient period of time must be allowed between the notice and hearing to permit the prisoner to prepare
adequately. 368 At the hearing, evidence relied upon to support
the transfer must be disclosed to the prisoner, and he or she
must be afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
state witnesses and to present documentary evidence and testimony by witnesses (unless good cause is shown to prohibit
such presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination).369
Assistance by a qualified and independent advisor-a licensed
psychiatrist or other mental health professional-must also be
provided.370 Finally, the independent decisionmaker must prepare a written statement of the evidence relied upon and of the
3 71
reasons for the transfer.
Although less formality may be required when the therapeutic intervention involves psychotropic drugs or behavioral
techniques administered in a setting less stigmatizing than the
mental hospital in Vitek, it is clear that an informal administrative determination by an independent decisionmaker is a mini365. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 28 Calm. . RPTm 2397 (1st Cir. 1980); Davis v.
Hubbard, No. C73-205 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 1980), summarized at 49 U.S.LW.
2215 (1980); Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), appeal docketed,
Nos. 79-2576, 79-2577 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1980).
366. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
367. Id. at 494-96.
3.68. Id. at 494.
369. Id. at 494-95.
370. Although four of the justices thought an attorney was required, id. at
497, Mr. Justice Powell, the swing vote in the Court's 5-4 decision, rejected this
view, finding that due process was satisfied by the provision of qualified and independent assistance by a mental health professional. Id. at 497-500 (Powell, J.,
concurring). His concurring opinion became the Court's opinion in the case.
Id. at 497. The four dissenters would have found the case moot. Id. at 501, 505
(Stewart, J. & Blacknun, J., dissenting).
371. Id. at 494-95.
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mal requirement before such techniques may be imposed. For
techniques falling on the lower end of the continuum of intrusiveness but still triggering due process protection, the courts
will probably be willing to accept managerial models in which
correctional decisions are subjected to administrative or
clinical review either by a higher level correctional official or by
a neutral and independent evaluator. 372 Administrative review
provided by the typical institutional review board, frequently
involving participation by prisoners and noninstitutional personnel, would seem to meet the due process requirements for
these less intrusive techniques.
It can be concluded that a hearing is not likely to be required before the imposition of traditional verbal rehabilitative
approaches, but that some kind of hearing will be required for
the less conventional and more intrusive techniques. When the
offender objects to these more intrusive therapies, the hearing
should consider the efficacy of the proposed approach; for those
therapies intruding on fundamental constitutional rights, the
hearing should address whether there are less drastic alternatives that would accomplish the government's interest. 373 For
offenders who consent to therapy, probably no due process
hearing will be required, except when highly intrusive techniques are used which result in substantial deprivations of fundamental rights; in the latter situation, courts may insist on a
hearing to ensure the adequacy and voluntariness of consent. 374 The nature of the hearing required in each case will
vary substantially, depending upon the extent of intrusion
upon protected constitutional rights and the court's evaluation
of the usefulness and costs of particular procedural safeguards.
Moreover, the amount of procedure will likely change over time
as professional and community attitudes toward the various
therapeutic interventions themselves change, and as the risks
and benefits of each become better understood.
372. Cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 616-17 (1979) (holding that staff physician review of a hospital admission decision for a juvenile was sufficient).
373. See Rogers v. Okin, 28 Cm. I. Rpm. 2397 (1st Cir. 1980); Rennie v.
Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1148 (D.N.J. 1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 79-2576, 792577 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1980).
374. See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 482 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (intrusive
aversive therapy).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CORRECTIONAL
RESEARCH

SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

Although much correctional research has been performed,
our knowledge remains primitive 378 concerning the causes and
correlates of criminality 376 and the effectiveness of correctional
therapy.3 77 Continued research and experimentation concerning these issues, therefore, seems essential. 378 Unfortunately,
volunteer subjects are sometimes not available, and when
available their consent and full knowledge could bias the sample or methodology, precluding scientifically adequate conclusions. If such research is to be performed at all, it must
frequently be conducted on an involuntary basis or with less
than the full disclosure generally thought necessary for informed consent. 37 9 Yet the very words "experimentation" and
"research" applied in correctional contexts, particularly on an
involuntary basis, evoke considerable controversy and the
spectre of Nuremburg.3 8o Indeed, recent cases have had a chilling effect on correctional research-almost no research is presently being conducted in correctional settings in this
country.3 8 ' Although concern with prison experimentation is
certainly legitimate, the categorical response it has evoked in
some discussions and proposals, 382 as well as in some statutory
375. See PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHABILITATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMNAL OFFENDERS 5-7, 27-34 (L Schrest, S.
White, E. Brown eds. 1979); Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 627, 646 (1966).
376. See generally BIOsOCIAL BASES OF CRIMNAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 40;
S. MEDNICK & S. SHOHAM, NEW PATHS IN CRIMINOLOGY-INTERDISCIPLINARY AND
INTERCULTURE EXPLORATIONS (1979); R. MONROE, BRAIN DYSFUNCTION IN AGGRESSIVE CRIMINALS (1978).
377. See generally E. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKEs, supra note 2.
378. See REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 2, at 10; Morris, supra
note 375, at 638, 646 ("Few will ... deny the need to establish empirically valid
foundations for the methods we use in preventing and treating crime ....
[T] here is widespread verbal agreement (if not action) that we must critically
test our developing armamentarium of prevention and treatment methods, and
that to do so requires testing by means of controlled clinical trials.").
379. See Riecken, supra note 41, at 2-7; Soble, Deception in Social Science
Researck Is Informed Consent Possible?, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 40, 40 (Oct.
1978); Zeisel, Reducing the Hazards of Human Experiments Through Modification of Research Design, 169 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCL 475, 475-476 (1970); Note,
Applying the Controlled Experiment to Penal Reform, 62 CORNELL I. REV. 158,
162 (1976).
380. See generally J. KATZ, supra note 55, at 1013-1052; PRISONER RESEARCH,
supra note 18.
381. Halleck, supra note 10, at 30-31.
382. E.g., ABA, Tentative Draft of StandardsRelating to the Legal Status of
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treatments 383 and administrative policies, 3 84 seems inappropriate. Rather than treating all types of research alike, or for that
matter attaching blanket legal sanctions to particular categories
of research, analysis in this area should focus on the effects of
the specific research in question.
The analysis proposed here parallels the discussion of an
offender's constitutional right to resist correctional therapy. A
continuum of intrusiveness similar to the one constructed for
the various rehabilitative techniques may be useful for the
classification of different types of correctional research. As
with the discussion of therapy, the focus should be upon the
extent of any physical or mental intrusion accompanying the
proposed research; the nature, extent and duration of its effects; and the extent to which these effects may be avoided or
resisted by unwilling subjects. 385 Research that seriously invades bodily privacy would implicate the fundamental constitutional right of privacy. Research that interferes with mental
processes would similarly implicate the first amendment. In
both cases strict judicial scrutiny of the governmental interests
furthered by such research as well as of the means used to accomplish these interests would be appropriate. Conversely, experimentation involving neither physical intrusions nor
interference with mental processes-survey research, for example-would not invade fundamental constitutional rights.
Under this analysis, some research that involves nonconsenting offenders may be constitutionally permissible. Research in the higher range of the continuum of intrusiveness,
however, may so intrude on constitutional rights that it could
be performed, if at all, only upon consenting subjects. Again,
the constitutional inquiry must address whether the government's interest in performing the research is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the subjects' individual liberty interests,
and whether the government's purpose could be accomplished
38 6
through less drastic means.
Whether the government interest in correctional research
can be classified as "compelling" is an open question. In a
number of contexts the Supreme Court has displayed sensitivPrisoners,14 Am. Cmm. L- REV. 375 (1977); American Correctional Ass'n, supra
note 281.
383. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3500-3524 (West Supp. 1970-1979); On. REv.
STAT. § 421.085 (1973).
384. See text accompanying notes 47-54 supra.
385. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
386. See text accompanying notes 219-23, 238-40 supra.
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ity to the societal need for research and experimentation in the
formulation of social policy.3 87 Because the government interest in protecting community safety is a compelling interest at
the core of the police power38 8 and because the government interest in offender rehabilitation would probably be deemed
compelling, research into the causes of criminality, into new
correctional treatment methods, and into the efficacy of ex389
isting methods, could similarly be seen as compelling.
Courts have upheld intrusions on bodily privacy in other contexts, but usually when there has been no less intrusive alternative. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,390 the Supreme Court
deemed the governmental interest in preventing the spread of
an epidemic sufficient to outweigh an individual's objections to
forced innoculation. Similarly, the government's police power
interest in gathering evidence of crime has been found sufficient to authorize forced blood tests of motor vehicle drivers to
determine whether they have been driving while intoxicated 391
and to justify surgical removal of bullets from suspects in a
387. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), in which Justice Brandeis stated:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with
serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has the power
to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due
process clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of
this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our
prejudices into legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.
Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). For a more recent case
applying these precepts, see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (noting that
"states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to
problems of vital local concern").
388. See notes 228-35 supra and accompanying text.
389. Indeed the government interest in therapeutic research should be considered more significant than the government interest in imposing treatments
on offenders. Such research would further not only the societal interest in limiting recidivism, but also the interests of those offenders who desire effective
rehabilitation. The societal interest may be met by incarceration alone, see
note 264 supra and accompanying text, but the interests of offenders in having
a choice of effective rehabilitative programs, and in exercising such a choice in
an informed manner, could not be served in the absence of therapeutic research.
390. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
391. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1957).
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criminal case. 392 Yet in these situations the bodily intrusions
were strictly necessary to serve the compelling interest in halting an epidemic or in obtaining evidence. With much correctional research, however, the governmental interest can be
fully accomplished with volunteer subjects, making involuntary
participation an unnecessarily drastic intrusion. Even if the
government's interest in research is deemed compelling in the
abstract, application of the "least restrictive alternative" principle3 93 would restrict research methodologies that involve extremely intrusive techniques. If the research can be performed
by utilizing noncorrectional populations or volunteer offenders,
then research invading fundamental rights will not be permitted with nonconsenting offenders. Moreover, if the goal of a
particular research project can be accomplished through means
which intrude less on protected liberties than the means proposed by correctional authorities, courts will uphold the offender's refusal to participate. Additionally, in considering
challenges to involuntary participation in research, courts may
insist on proof of the experiment's scientific validity.39 4
One other factor might be weighed into the balance between prisoner liberties and governmental interests. When a
governmental agency purports to have authority to infringe
upon fundamental rights, courts have sometimes insisted on an
explicit legislative expression of that authority.395 In Kent v.
Dulles,396 the Supreme Court held that the Passport Act of
1926, which granted the Secretary of State the authority to
"grant and issue passports.., under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe," 397 was insufficient authority for a regulation prohibiting issuance of passports to
members of the Communist Party. Finding that the regulation
impinged upon the constitutionally protected right to travel,
the Court held that "[wihere activities or enjoyment, natural
392. See United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 788 (1977).
393. See notes 238-46 supra and accompanying text.
394. See Capron, Social Experimentation and the Law, in ETmCAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 127, 152 (A. Rivlen & P. Tinpane eds.
1975); Rutstein, The Ethical Design of Human Experiments, in EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 383-401 (P. Freund ed. 1969).
395. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308-309 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105-14 (1976);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); J.FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 8385 (1978); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMiNsTRATIVE LAW 47-48 (1976).
396. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
397. Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 772, § 1, 44 Stat., pt. 2, 887, quoted in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 123 (1958).
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and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen
. . . are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them." 398 Referring to the Passport
Act, the Court could not "find in this broad generalized power
39 9
an authority to trench so heavily on the rights of the citizen."
Thus, particularly when faced with correctional research that
would seriously invade constitutional rights, courts may well
hold that a general legislative delegation 40 0 is insufficient to
support the agency's assertion of authority to conduct such research. This approach allows courts to avoid deciding the constitutional issue and in effect, remands the underlying policy
question to the legislature for decision with an awareness that
its choice will implicate fundamental values and will be subjected to searching constitutional scrutiny.4 01
This framework for analyzing challenges to involuntary
participation in correctional research is virtually identical to
that developed for consideration of similar objections to involuntary therapy. Certain types of research, however, present issues that might not arise with most correctional therapies.
Research involving mere observation of offenders, or the collection of information concerning them-including physical, psychiatric, psychological, neurological, electroencephalographic,
and other physiological testing and measurement-does not
have a parallel in correctional therapy. These invasions of essentially informational privacy present a different constitutional issue.
In a number of contexts, the courts have recognized that
"the privacy of one's personal affairs is protected by the Constitution. ' 40 2 In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford,43 for example, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in civil injury
suits may not be forced to submit to surgical examinations concerning the extent of injuries. The Court stressed the right to
personal privacy: "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
398. 357 U.S. at 129.
399. Id.
400. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4042(1) (1976) (delegation to bureau of prisons to
"have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal [prisons]").
401. See A. BIcKEL, TnE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111-98 (1962); J. FREEDMAN, supra note 395, at 83; Tribe, The Emerging Reconnection of Individual
Rights and InstitutionalDesign: Federalism, Bureaucracy,and Due Processof
Lawmaking, 10 CREiGHTON L. REv. 433, 442-43 (1977).
402. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1129 (1979).
403. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
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individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law." 40 4 The Botsford Court did
recognize, however, that a strong public interest could override
the privacy right.405
More recently in Whalen v. Roe,406 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that constitutional privacy protects "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,"407 but
nonetheless upheld a statutory scheme for maintaining computerized records of prescriptions for certain dangerous
drugs. 40 8 The record-keeping requirements included mandatory recording of patient names and addresses-a procedure
that was challenged by both physicians and patients. The
Court found that the patients' constitutional privacy was infringed by the statutory requirement, but stressed the strong
state interest in minimizing the misuse of dangerous drugs and
the detailed statutory safeguards to prevent unauthorized use
of the records. In language that would seem applicable to correctional research as well, the Court found that important public purposes under the police power can justify collection and
use of personal data, at least pursuant to a system containing
safeguards against unwarranted disclosure. 409 Similarly in
Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth,41o the Supreme Court upheld
404. Id. at 251.
405. The Court cited the common law writ de ventre inspeciendo as an example. This writ authorized physical examinations of women convicted of capital crimes to determine whether they were pregnant in order to prevent the
death of an unborn child. See id. at 253.
406. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
407. Id. at 599.
408. Id. at 600.
409. Id. at 605.
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the
distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of
public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement
of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use
such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.
Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has roots
in the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its
implementing administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern
with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
410. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 452-54 (1976) (public interest in preserving presidential documents
outweighed President Nixon's privacy interests).

1981]

CORRECTIONAL THERAPY

abortion record-keeping and reporting requirements, holding
that the state interest in the preservation of maternal health
was sufficient to override the patient's privacy claim, at least
where confidentiality was respected. 41 ' A more extreme invasion of privacy was recently sanctioned in Bell v. Wofsh,412
where the Supreme Court held that pretrial detainees could be
required to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as
part of a strip search following every contact visit with a person
from outside the institution. Although the inmates were not
touched by security personnel during the procedure, the inmates were subject to very close visual inspection. 4 13 Noting
that it did not "underestimate the degree to which these
searches may invade the privacy of inmates," 414 the Court nevertheless upheld the searches on less than probable cause,
finding that the governmental interest in security outweighed
415
the individual interest in privacy.
In these and a number of lower court cases following a similar approach, 4 16 courts have applied neither strict nor minimal
scrutiny to interference with informational privacy. The courts
instead adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny that balances
specific governmental and individual interests and requires
reasonable safeguards against unnecessary invasions of privacy.4 17 Judged by this standard, correctional research concerning the causes of criminality or the efficacy of various
411. 428 U.S. at 79-81.
412. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
413. Male inmates were required to lift their genitals and bend over to
spread their buttocks for visual inspection; female inmates were subjected to
visual inspection of vaginal and anal cavities. Id. at 558 & n.39.
414. Id. at 560.
415. Id. at 559-60. Accord, Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 294-95 (10th
Cir.) (upholding rectal searches of prisoners conducted by trained para-professional medical assistants), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973).
416. See generally Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding a state financial disclosure law for elected officials against a claim of undue
interference with informational privacy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Hawaii 1979) (granting
preliminary injunction against enforcement of state anti-medicaid fraud statute
permitting prosecutors to inspect confidential files of psychotherapists, finding
the state interest insufficient to outweigh the individual privacy interest in
preventing disclosure of such highly personal information); McKenna v. Fargo,
451 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.J. 1978) (finding that a city's interest in screening
firefighters is sufficient to justify psychiatric testing of applicants), a fd, 601
F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1979); Kochman v. Keansburg Bd. of Educ., 124 N.J. Super. 203,
305 A.2d 807 (1973) (finding the state interest in protecting children sufficient to
justify the infringement on privacy resulting from a requirement that teachers
undergo psychiatric examination).
417. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132-34 (5th Cir. 1978); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Axiyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1039-45 (D. Hawaii 1979).
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correctional therapies will probably be considered sufficiently
important to justify reasonable intrusions on informational privacy of offenders. This is particularly likely in the case of incarcerated offenders who are customarily subjected to official
surveillance and enjoy a vastly reduced expectation of privacy.4 18 Furthermore, the fact that collection and publication of
this information in scientific studies will probably not involve
disclosure of information identifying particular offenders
419
reduces the extent of intrusion.
Even the collection of data that involves minimal touching
or invasion of bodily privacy and is not seriously intrusive,
such as physical, neurological, and physiological examinations
and measurements, will probably be upheld. Other involuntary
invasions of bodily privacy-vaccinations, blood tests, rectal
searches, surgical removal of a bullet-have been upheld on a
showing of clear necessity, procedural regularity, and minimal
pain. 420 Thus it seems likely that research involving some bodily invasions will be allowed when the research program is
deemed sufficiently important, when the data may not easily be
obtained elsewhere or on a voluntary basis, and when minimally intrusive procedures are used. When research passes a
sufficient threshold of intrusiveness, however, courts will apply
strict scrutiny-requiring both a compelling governmental interest and use of the least drastic means. Of course, as with intrusive therapy, offenders may give informed consent and
waive their constitutional right to refuse to participate. 42'
Neither the fact of incarceration per se nor the prospect or
418. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 142-45 (1972) (discussing whether
fourth amendment would be violated by interception of conversation in jail visiting room); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 114-16 (D. Conn. 1966) (secret
filming of prisoner in parole hearing did not invade privacy).
419. When information about individual offenders is essential, however, the
courts will probably allow disclosure. In Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass.
251, 249 N.E.2d 610, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1969) the Supreme Court of Massachusetts enjoined the showing to the general public of a film depicting life at
a state mental hospital, which included scenes of identifiable patients as well
as some patient nudity. However, the court permitted the showing of the film
to specialized audiences:
It is a film which would be instructive to legislators, judges, lawyers,
sociologists, social workers, doctors, psychiatrists, students in these or
related fields, and organizations dealing with the social problems of
custodial care and mental infirmity. The public interest in having such
persons informed about Bridgewater, in our opinion, outweighs any
countervailing interests of the inmates and of the Commonwealth (as
parens patriae) in anonimity and privacy.
Id. at 262, 249 N.E.2d at 618.
420. L. TRmB, supra note 110, at 194-95; see Jaffe, supra note 70, at 212.
421. See notes 269-316 supra and accompanying text.
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promise of release or avoidance of incarceration in exchange
for participation will necessarily render informed consent im42 2
possible.
B.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS

Procedural due process may require notice and a hearing
before use of correctional research, even for those types of research found to be constitutionally permissible without informed consent. The general framework developed earlier for
423
will
applying procedural due process to correctional therapy
apply as well to correctional research. Thus, research involving
physical bodily intrusions of more than a de minimus nature
would be subject to the requirements of procedural due process. It is an open question, however, whether forced participation in research involving lesser intrusions will be deemed to
so infringe liberty interests as to trigger due process protection.
Under Meachum v. Fano,424 traditional rehabilitative therapy
may be imposed without a hearing 425 because such therapy
falls "within the normal limits or range of custody which the
conviction has authorized the State to impose." 426 The "normal
range of custody," however, does not clearly include forced participation in research, even if only minimally intrusive. The
"normal limits or range of custody" to which convicted defendants may be subject under Meachum without additional due
process seem to be defined in large part by relevant statutory
and regulatory law. The typical statutory delegation of authority to correctional agencies, although authorizing correctional
treatment either expressly or by implication, does not empower
the agencies to perform nonconsensual research or experimentation. Thus, even given Meachum's restrictive view of the liberty enjoyed by prisoners, many forms of involuntary
correctional research could be held to invade constitutional liberty. Of course, there is a "de minimus level of imposition with
which the Constitution is not concerned,"4 2 7 which could encompass research involving mere observation of offenders, accumulation of information concerning them or concerning
422. See notes 301-16 supra and accompanying text; Singer, upra note 295.
See also Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 218-21 (D. Md. 1979).
423. See notes 317-72 supra and accompanying text.
424. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
425. See notes 325-26 supra and accompanying text.
426. 427 U.S. at 225.
427. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
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correctional therapy programs, and even the performance of inoffensive physical and physiological measurement and testing.
When due process is held to apply, courts will likely permit
informal procedures to be used-at least for research that is
not highly intrusive.42 8 Rather than formal trial-type hearings,
the courts will probably be willing to accept procedures involving administrative or clinical review of the research protocol
and of the selection process for subjects. The review provided
by the typical institutional review board429 would seem generally sufficient for all but highly intrusive research. For intrusive research, assuming it to be substantively permissible, the
hearing would be more formal and would strictly scrutinize the
research by questioning whether it is scientifically valid,
whether there are less drastic means of conducting the proposed research, and whether noncorrectional populations or
consenting offenders could be used instead.
C.

THE CONSTrTUTION AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To be scientifically valid, correctional research must be performed by means of controlled experimentation which requires, among other things, the random assignment of subjects
to the experimental group and to the control group. 430 Yet random assignment often appears discriminatory--"some people
receive the experimental treatment while others are excluded
from it, and either treatment or its withholding may involve
risk of harm" 43 3--a common perception that may raise constitu428. See notes 360-72 supra and accompanying text.
429. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1979); notes 47-48 supra and accompanying

text.
430. REHAB=LrrATIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 2, at 6-7, 16-17, 60-61, 66; Farrington, supra note 40, at 312-13; Morris, supra note 375, at 646-47; Rezmovic,
MethodologicalConsiderationsin Evaluating CorrectionalEffectiveness: Issues
and Chronic Problems, in REHABILrTATIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 2, at 163,
164-66; Zeisel, supra note 379, at 476-77; Zimring, Measuring the Impact of Pretrail Diversionfrom the CriminalJustice System, 41 U. CHL I REV. 224, 235, 23839 (1974); Note, supra note 379, at 160-61. Examples of social experiments using
random selection are numerous. See, e.g., Breger, Legal Issues Raised by Randomized Social Experiments, in PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, 9-1,9-

7 (R. Boruch, J. Ross & J. Cecil eds. 1979). Such random experimentation has
been conducted in the legal system. See, e.g., Shapard, Ethical Issues in Experimentation in the Law: Structural Concerns (unpublished discussion draft pre-

pared for the Federal Judicial Center Advisory Commission on
Experimentation in the Law, 1979); Woods, Random Assignment to Treatment
Groups: A Strategyfor JudicialResearch, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 230 (1979).
431. Zeisel, supra note 379, at 475. See also Cramton, Driver Behavior and
Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L, REV. 421, 451-52 (1969)
(controlled experiment threatens principle that equals be treated equally).
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tional problems under the fourteenth amendment guarantee of
equal protection.432 Nevertheless, when the research process is
fully examined against the mandate of the equal protection
clause, random assignment of research subjects, with limited
exceptions, appears readily permissible.
The equal protection clause does not require that govern433
it imposes a
ment treat all persons similarly situated alike;
as retreatment
burden on government to justify differential
jusof
degree
The
purpose.
lated to a legitimate governmental
the
of
tification required will depend upon the nature
action
government
the
individual interest affected and whether
434
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a "suspect" class.
Most classifications challenged on equal protection grounds
will be subjected to minimal scrutiny, requiring only that the
classification bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. 435 In cases involving "suspect classifica437
and national origin 43 8 -or
tions"-such as race, 436 alienage,
432. See REHABILITATIVE TECHNIQUES, supra note 2, at 9, 100; Baunach, Random Assignment in CriminalJustice Research: Some Ethical and Legal Issues,
17 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 440 (1980) (LEAA staff conclusion that equal protection
places legal restrictions on random assignment of selection techniques); Breger, supra note 430, at 9-6; Riecken, supra note 41, at 2-7; Teitelbaum, Spurious,
Tractable, and IntractableLegal Problems: A Positivist Approach to Law and
Social Science Research, in PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH, 12-20 (R.

Boruch, J. Ross & J. Cecil eds. 1979); Note, supra note 379, at 162.
433. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
434. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (defining a
suspect class as one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process").

435. See L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 994-96; Note, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1076-87 (1969). See generally
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). So narrow is judicial review
under the rational basis test that "those challenging the legislative judgment
must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979). The classification will be upheld unless "the varying treatment of different groups or
persons is so unrelated to that achievement of any combination of legitimate
purposes that [a court] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." Id. at 97. "In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to
judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in
areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines
.... " New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
436. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
437. See, e.g., Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
438. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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439
interstate
affecting "fundamental rights"-such as voting,
40
the chalthat
travel," or procreation44--courts will require
a
achieve
to
necessary
lenged classification be shown to be
2
has
Court
Supreme
the
compelling state interest." Recently,
applied a form of intermediate scrutiny to classifications that
affect important but not necessarily "fundamental" interests or
that are based on sensitive but not necessarily "suspect" criteria." 3 Under intermediate scrutiny, the challenged classification "must serve important governmental objectives and must
44
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
In the correctional context, courts have held that differen445
or sex, 4 6 including discriminatial treatment based on race
7
tion in prison job assignments" or in access to vocational
8
education programs," violates equal protection. Random selection in correctional research, however, is not based on a prisoner's membership in a class, suspect or otherwise. Hence,
such selection generally would be subjected to minimum scrutiny requiring only a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose-at least for research that does not invade
fundamental constitutional rights. Because the goal of correctional research is surely a legitimate and probably even a com9
pelling governmental interest," and because "It]he controlled
experiment is an indispensable instrument in our search45for
1
0
knowledge," 4 5 the rational basis test should be easily met.

439. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
440. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
441. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
442. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972); Note,
supra note 435, at 1088, 1101-1103, 1121-22.
443. L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 1082-92; Note, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1, 177 (1977). The Court, for example, has applied intermediate scrutiny in cases involving illegitimacy, see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 767-76 (1977), and gender. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976).
444. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Supreme Court has not
specified whether the quoted standard, enunciated in a case involving classiflcations based on sex, is applicable to classifications based on illegitimacy.
Note, supra note 443, at 180.
445. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1960).
446. See, e.g., Molar v. Gates, 98 Cal. App. 3d 1, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979).
447. See, e.g., Saunders v. Sumner, 366 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. Va. 1973); Holt v.
Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
448. See, e.g., Glover v. Johnson, 478 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Gates
v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affid, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
449. See Teitelbaum, supra note 432, at 12-22; note 436 supra and accompanying text.
450. Zeisel, supra note 379, at 475.
451. See Breger, supra note 430, at 9-11; Capron, Social Experimentation
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Use of random and nonrandom selection criteria in various
experimental settings has been challenged on equal protection
grounds. In Marshall v. United States,452 drug addicts with two
or more prior felony convictions challenged Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitiation Act of 1966,453 a statute which offered discretionary rehabilitative commitment in lieu of penal
incarceration to first offender addicts. Although this "correctional experiment" did not employ random assignment, the
Court's approach is illuminating. In upholding the statutory
scheme, the Court applied the rational basis test, noting that
convicted defendants have no fundamental right to rehabilitation from addiction at public expense, and that no suspect classification was used by the statutory scheme.454 Recognizing
that the program was "fundamentally experimental in nature" 45 5 the Court noted that "in areas fraught with medical
and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation." 456 The Court stressed that the classification selected
was not "directed 'against' any individual or category of persons, but rather it represented a policy choice in an experimental program made by that branch of Government vested with
the power to make such choices."457
Two state courts have relied on Marshall to uphold, against
equal protection attack, experimental projects under which
drunken drivers were punished differently because prosecuted
in different districts. 458 These cases support the principle that,
if selection criteria are rational, government experimentation
offering a possible benefit to some, but not all who are similarly
situated will not offend equal protection-at least where the
benefit is one to which there is no constitutional entitlement.
Geographic sampling has been held a rational criteria. Random
assignment, which also is the preferred method of determining
the effectiveness of a program or testing social science research
and the Law, in ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssuEs OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 155-63
(A. Rivlon & T. Timpane eds. 1975).
452. 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
453. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-4255 (1976).
454. 414 U.S. at 421.
455. Id. at 426.
456. Id. at 427.
457. Id. at 428.
458. See generally McGlothen v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal. App.
3d 1005, 140 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1977); Healy v. Bristol, 367 Mass. 909, 327 N.E.2d 894
(1975). See also Commonwealth v. Kindness, 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 99, 371 A.2d
1346 (1977) (equal protection not violated by excluding from pretrial diversion
program defendants charged with driving while intoxicated).
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hypotheses, 4 59 should also meet this test.
In nonexperimental contexts involving allocation of scarce
resources or government benefits, random allocation-as by
lot-has been suggested as the least objectionable method of
allocation. 460 When individual differences seem irrelevant to
the making of such choices, as in deciding which of many patients in need receives limited kidney dialysis treatment,
randomization has been urged as the most ethical method of
selection.4 6 ' One empirical study of candidates for an innovative educational program revealed that random assignment was
perceived by the candidates as the fairest method of selection.462 Indeed, courts have suggested that "in cases where
many candidates are equally qualified ... further selections be
made in some reasonable manner such as 'by lot.' ,463
Even in cases, both experimental and nonexperimental, involving governmental imposition of burdens rather than benefits, random selection has been upheld. In Aguayo v.
Richardson,464 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld against equal protection challenge an experimental project
in which welfare recipients in selected districts were required
to register for training and employment. In an opinion strongly
endorsing controlled experimentation, Judge Friendly, applying
the rational basis test, rejected the argument that unequal ap465
plication of the work requirement violated equal protection.
459. See SocIAL EXPERIMENTATION 4-9, 53-55 (H. Riecken & R. Boruch eds.
1974); Campbell, Reforms as Experiments, 24 AM. PSYCH.409, 426 (1969); Wortman & Rabinowitz, Random Assignment The Fairestof Them All, in PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS: CONFERENCE ON ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS

IN APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH 15-1-15-10 (R. Boruch, J. Ross & J. Cecil eds.

1979).
460. See Greely, The Equality of Allocation by Lot, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L,
REV. 113 (1977).
461.

See P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT TO PERSON:

EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL

ETHICS 247 (1970); Freund, Introduction to EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN SuBJECTS at xvii (1970). But see E. CAHN,THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG
IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAw 71 (1955).

462. Wortman & Rabinowitz, supra note 459.
463. Holmes v. New York Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (allocation of low-rent public housing) (quoting Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 60910 (5th Cir. 1964) (involving the allocation of liquor licenses)). See also Star
Television, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C.
Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissenting) (discussing random allocation of broadcasting
licenses), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
464. 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974).
465. [The] Equal Protection clause should not be held to prevent a
state from conducting an experiment designed for the good of all, including the participants, on less than a state-wide basis. The objections to allowing officials "to pick and choose only a few to whom they
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Determining that the government interest in improving the
welfare system Was "as 'legitimate' or 'appropriate' as anything
can be," the court found that this interest would be "'suitably
furthered' by controlled experiment, a method long used in
medical science which has its application in the social sciences
as well."46 6 In nonexperimental contexts involving government
imposition of burdens by lot, at least where alternative methods seem unavailable or more objectionable, equal protection
467
challenges have been similarly denied.
When the burden infringes a fundamental constitutional
right, however, random imposition of the burden is more dubious. Random police stops of motor vehicles to check the license of the operator and the registration of the car, for
example, were recently held to violate privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.4 6 8 The Supreme Court suggested that
spot check decisions based on observed violations or more individualized factors giving rise to articulable suspicion would be
appropriate, as would other methods "that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion."4 6 9 Analogously, death penalty laws that automatically
impose capital punishment for certain crimes without considering individualized factors have been found to violate the eighth
will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that
might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected,". . . are
inapposite to the selection, on a random but rational basis, of certain
areas of the state to try out a program for the very purpose of determining whether it, or some variation of it should be made applicable to
alL The Equal Protection clause does not place a state in a vise where
its only choices in dealing with the problems ... are to do nothing or
plunge into statewide action.
473 F.2d at 1109-10. The right to welfare, involved in Aguayo, had previously
been held by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental right. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
466. 473 F.2d at 1109. See also Britt v. McKenney, 529 F.2d 44, 45 n.1 (1st Cir.
1976).
467. The draft lottery, for example, under which persons available for induction into the armed services or chosen in order of birthdates selected by lottery, was upheld against equal protection challenge. See, e.g., United States v.
Joh~nson, 473 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1972). Grand and petit jury pools are chosen
through random selection, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1862-1863 (1976), which is thought to
avoid the arbitrary exclusion from the jury of any particular class of persons.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 518 F.2d 81 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 997
(1977). Selection by lot has also long been appropriate in the desperate situation when shipwrecked lifeboat occupants have run out of food. See United
States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. PA. 1842).
468. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-57, 663 (1979).
469. Id. at 663.
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amendment,4 70 as have such laws that leave the life or death
decision to the total discretion of the jury, allowing arbitrariness and discrimination in the application of the penalty. 471
These cases, invalidating imposition of substantial burdens
where more reasonable or equitable methods than randomization are available, may be distinguished from those involving
allocation of benefits, such as the rehabilitative alternatives to
prison or license suspension involved in Marshall and the state
47 2
cases dealing with driving while intoxicated.
The death penalty cases and the case invalidating random
motor vehicle stops indicate that there are some constitutional
limitations on the use of randomization in correctional research
that burdens fundamental rights. In the case of sentencing decisions affecting liberty-one of the most fundamental valuesrandomization would seem constitutionally offensive if its use
produces more severe intervention than would normally occur.4 73 In any event, correctional research that invades funda470. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 636-38 (1977); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-05 (1976). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978) (invalidating a death penalty statute that strictly limited the range of
mitigating circumstances a trial judge could consider on the basis that the
eighth amendment requires individualized consideration of such factors for
each defendant).
471. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court has upheld
death penalty laws, however, which contained criteria channelling the exercise
of jury discretion. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
472. See notes 452-58 supra and accompanying text. The distinction recalls
Norvall Morris' suggestion that correctional research may be permissible if performed in accordance with what he calls the principle of "less severity":
[T] he new treatment being studied should not be one that is regarded
in the mind of the criminal subjected to it, or of the people imposing
the new punishment, or of the community at large, as more severe than
the traditional treatment against which it is being compared. To take a
group of criminals who otherwise would be put on probation and to select some at random from a group who would otherwise be incarcerated and to treat them on probation or in a probation hostel would
seem to be no abuse of human rights.
Morris, supra note 375, at 648-49.
473. Surely this is true in the case of the death penalty, for in (but perhaps
only in) that context the eighth amendment demands that punishment be
based on individualized consideration. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
303-05 (1976); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (noting the "degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual"). The essence of the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments," Mr. Justice Brennan has
suggested, is "condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments."
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). The ban
on arbitrary infliction of severe punishments, which could be considered to apply to randomized sentencing alternatives, lies, in Mr. Justice Brennan's view,
in the "notion that the State does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict
upon others." Id. Treating identical offenders differently, at least in respect to
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mental constitutional rights, whether or not it involves
sentencing, will be strictly scrutinized. If such research is
otherwise constitutionally permissible, the government's interest in conducting it will necessarily be sufficiently compelling
to outweigh the individual's fundamental right to refuse it. The
constitutionality of random assignment in correctional research
that burdens fundamental rights will therefore turn on the necessity of controlled experimentation, as opposed to alternative
research strategies where random assignment can be avoided
or minimized. 47 4 Although in other contexts randomness may
be the quintessence of arbitrariness, in the context of a controlled experiment it is often essential and almost per se reasonable. 47 5 In research, "randomness has the advantage of
imposition of severe punishments, without some justification grounded in individualized differences between them, may thus be deemed unconstitutional.
The opinions of two other Justices in Furman lend support to this view. Mr.
Justice White found the death penalty, as administered pursuant to statutes
vesting capital juries with unlimited discretion, unconstitutional since "there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). And
Mr. Justice Stewart found death sentences so imposed to be "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For,
of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as
these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random
handful upon which the sentence of death has in fact been imposed." Id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Whether and to what extent these notions will
apply outside the context of the death penalty is an open question. Although
Mr. Justice Brennan's language in Furman applies to "severe punishments"
without limitation, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the penalty of
death is different in kind from any of the punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). Compare
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) with Corbitt v. New Jersey, 99 S.
Ct. 492 (1978); compare Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) with Britton v.
Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980).
474. See Baunach, supra note 432, at 440-42; Rezmovic, supra note 430, at
166-77; Zeisel, supra note 379, at 475-76. See generally Symposium on Empirical
Research in Administrative Law, Part I, 31 AD.I. REv. 443 (1979). These alternative research strategies are sometimes equally feasible as random selection
or only minimally less so.
475. See Breger, supra note 430, at 9-11; Capron, supra note 451, at 160-62;
Riecken, supra note 41, at 2-7; Teitelbaum, supra note 432, at 12-23. Professor
Capron has put it well:
Random selection is arbitrary only in the sense that it depends on the
caprice of chance; its outcome is uncertain and unexplainable on rational grounds-indeed, that is what makes it valuable in experimentation. It is not arbitrary in the sense of being dependent on the pleasure
of the person making the selection, and that is the arbitrariness that
has earned a bad name in consitutional jurisprudence, for the obvious
reason that persons with arbitrary powers may behave despotically
and may use their discretion to impose burdens unfairly and on impermissible grounds (for example, race, ethnic group, or national origin).
Furthermore, unlike other kinds of decisionmaking, Which use the
cloak of discretion to frustrate review, random selection in experimen-
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being evenhanded and rationally related to the state's (and investigator's) interest in conducting a valid experiment." 476 In
correctional research then, the use of random selection should
therefore be constitutionally permissible when fundamental
rights are not infringed, and perhaps even when they are infringed if other research designs would not be feasible.
VII.

CONCLUSION: ETHICAL AND PROFESSONAL
CONCERNS

This Article has presented a framework of legal limitations
on correctional treatment and research and has outlined the direction in which the law appears to be moving with respect to
these issues. Although the law obviously plays an important
role in limiting the activities of those involved with offender rehabilitation and research, it acts against a backdrop of ethical
and professional controls that frequently operate much more
directly and effectively on the actors in the rehabilitation process. 477 Legal developments in this area will derive from legislative, regulatory, and judicial sources that necessarily lack the
insight and expertise of those in the field. As a result, the law
is likely to develop generalized approaches and to respond
most sharply to exposed abuses in a manner that will make
correctional rehabilitators and researchers feel misunderstood.
Professional and ethical controls are always to be preferred.
This preference, if not the threat of the legal controls that this
Article describes, should prompt the various disciplines involved in correctional rehabilitation and research to implement
reforms before they are imposed from without.
Although much work needs to be done by the relevant professional disciplines, some initial steps have been taken. Ethical and professional standards for the conduct of human
experimentation in medical research have been adopted by
some organizations. 47 8 Codes for the conduct of social and behavioral research have also been adopted 479 and a growing
body of scholarly work is available that deals with the ethical
tation can be reviewed; that is, a statistician can determine whether
the method used did generate a random result.
Capron, supra note 451, at 161-62.
476. Capron, supra note 451, at 163.
477. See Jaffe, supra note 70, at 205.
478. See, e.g., Nuremberg Code, supra note 55; Helsinki Declaration, supra
note 59; 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1979).
479. E.g., American Psychology Ass'n., Code of Ethics, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
ALMANAC: A HANDBOOK FOR STUDENTS (H.E. Wilkening ed. 1973); American

Psychiatry Ass'n Board of Social & Ethical Responsibility for Psychology, Re-
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problems of medical, social, and behavioral experimentation in480
volving human subjects.
Ethical and professional standards, however, have not adequately addressed the involuntary imposition of correctional
rehabilitation. For example, although leading behavior ther482
consider a patient's
apists 4 81 and professional organizations

informed consent an ethical prerequisite to treatment, the
fairly routine violation of this principle in correctional settings
has met with little in the way of professional condemnation or
discussion. A body of scholarship concerning the ethical limitations on forced treatment has begun to emerge,48 3 and consideration has been given to the ethical problem presented by the
role of the correctional therapist as a "double agent" with loyalties both to patient and governmental employer.484 Rigorous
application of clear standards, however, has yet to emerge.
It is earnestly hoped that this Article will provoke further
development of professional and ethical standards concerning
correctional therapy and research. Although the law may not
prohibit some types of involuntary correctional therapy and research, substantial ethical and policy questions remain. Widely
port of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the CriminalJustice System,
33 AM. PSYCH. 1099 (1978).
480. See, e.g., G. BERmANT, H. KELMAN & D. WARWICK, THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL
INTERVENTION (1978); DEVIANCE AND DECENCY: THE ETHmCS OF RESEARCH WITH
HUMAN SuBJEcTs (C. Klockars & F. O'Connor eds. 1979); ETHICAL AND LEGAL IS-

SUES, supra note 62; C. FRIED, supra note 71; J. KATZ, supra note 55; P. RAMSEY,
supra 461; SOCIAL RESEARCH IN CONFLICT wLrr LAW AND ETHICS (P. Nejelski ed.
1976); Bloomberg & Wilkens, Ethics of Research Involving Human Subjects in
Criminal Justice, 23 CRIE & DELINQUENCY 435 (1977). The various reports of
the National Commission treat this subject in great detail. See THE BELMONT
REPORT, supra note 273; SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 12; RESEARCH INVOLVING
CHILDREN (1977); RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY
INFIRM (1978); PRISONER RESEARCH, supra note 18.

481. E.g., Bandura, supra note 175; Davison & Stuart, Behavior Therapy and
Civil Liberties, 30 AM. PSYCH. 755 (1975).
482. E.g., Ass'n for Advancement of Behavior Therapy, Ethical Issues for
Human Services, 8 BEHAVIOR THERAPY 763 (1977).
483.

See, e.g., LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES, IV TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED

TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH 1359 (1978); Halleck, supra
note 113; Robinson, Harm, Offense and Nuisance: Some FirstSteps in the Establishment of an Ethics of Treatment, 29 AM. PSYCH. 233 (1974); Shapiro, supra
note 24.
484. See, e.g., LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES, IV TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITrED
TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH 1474-76 (1978); American Psy-

chological Ass'n Board of Social & Ethical Responsibility for Psychology, supra
note 479; WHO IS THE CLIENT? THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IN

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (J. Monahan ed. 1980); In the Service ofthe State:
the Psychiatristas Double Agent, 8 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Spec. Supp. Apr.
1978); Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 A.BA.J.
1521 (1974).
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shared societal values, emphasizing the dignity and autonomy
of the individual, place a strong ethical burden on those who
would subject offenders to involuntary participation in treatment or research, 485 and should, at a minimum, remove decisionmaking in these areas from the sole discretion of
rehabilitators and investigators. It is ironical that the constitutionality of coercive imposition of treatment turns to a large extent on the ability of the offender to avoid or resist unwanted
effects. Although the law may permit their involuntary imposition, the rehabilitative techniques on the lower end of the continuum of intrusiveness will be ineffective absent the offender's
voluntary cooperation and genuine desire for change.48 6 Hence,
efficacy and ethical principles combine to favor a voluntary
rather than a coercive approach to these techniques. 487 Although it may be appropriate to impose a brief period of compulsory participation so that the offender's choice will be more
informed, and perhaps even to attempt to persuade offenders
that it is in their own best interests to participate, the choice
should ultimately be a voluntary one for which the offender
4 88
suffers no sanctions as a result of his or her decision.
Ethical and professional concerns should be particularly
heightened when the subjects of therapy or research are as vulnerable and isolated from public scrutiny as are offenders
within prisons or those diverted to the new community alternatives. There should be no greater willingness to experiment
with or coercively "rehabilitate" offenders than other citizens
who might benefit from these techniques. If the professional
community does not recognize these ethical principles and respond to the problems created by the more intrusive approaches, the law must and will.
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and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U. PA. I. REV. 550, 552 (1978).
486. See notes 112-16, 153-57, supra and accompanying text.
487. N. MoRRs, supra note 1, at 24.
488. See id. at 18-20. See generally A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAAN, supra
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